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THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

ROGER PEARSON
General Editor

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EXPLOITING SPACE IN PEACE AND WAR

Robert C. Richardson III
Deputy Director, High Frontier Inc.

The time has come to open up near space and exploit all the civil scientific, and military possibilities this promises. Space is the new frontier, if not the last frontier. The potential benefits to mankind that ready access to space promises are too numerous to list or even speculate upon. So, why don't we get on with it? We have placed people and objects into space for over 30 years while barely making a dent in the potential this new arena offers humanity.

I suggest that the principle inhibitor to full and effective exploitation beyond the new high frontier has been the cost of getting there. One does not go anywhere to do anything if it costs more to get there than what one can do there is worth. When travel costs are excessive the trip is only worthwhile if the value of the expected returns from it exceed these costs. The sad news is that at today's cost of $5000 to $10,000 dollars per pound to get up to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and back, very few ventures meet this criteria. The good news is that there is no need for us to pay these exorbitant travel costs anymore.

The Importance of Cost

Even at today's costs of access, space is becoming ever more important to both national security and economic progress. The key to effective missile defenses, President Reagan's SDI proposal to perpetuate deterrence of war, lies in its space based missile intercept systems. The key to getting these deployed in today's deficit environment lies in reducing costs, including those of putting the systems up there. Without space based surveillance and tracking and the ability to engage missiles in their boost phase, which requires

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space based attack systems, a cost effective and affordable SDI would be out of the question.

The key to continued US world leadership in the next century, as well as economic growth, lies in our maintaining progress in technology. Space is now the principal arena for this effort. The vast potential benefits to be derived from the exploitation of space can and will keep the US out on the "cutting edge" of technology – provided we do not adopt policies that impede our own ability to make progress across this new frontier.

A simple review of the major factors that led to the opening up of new frontiers in the past suggests that these fall into three broad categories. We might call these the stepping stones to their exploitation. They are: the laws and policies under which the new areas could be developed and exploited; the availability of transportation to cross the new frontiers; and the type and extent of government support furnished to the people going there. Only after each of these stepping stones has been put in place can would-be colonists and explorers effectively develop, occupy and exploit the new world awaiting them.

A chart illustrating how these stepping stones were developed and utilized first in the initial colonization of the eastern seaboard of America and subsequently of the American West, and comparing this with what is and has been done in the case of the High Frontier, suggests that in our attempts to develop space the cart has been placed ahead of the horse. The world has been trying to exploit and use space for military purposes and for civil communications before establishing the proper policies and providing the cost effective transportation systems needed to open up this new world to free enterprise initiatives and colonists. Until travel costs come down to well under $100 per lb, space will remain a playground for governments and their bureaucrats. The people of the world deserve better after paying for over 30 years of this.

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COST OF CURRENT SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

VEHICLE	TOTAL COST	PAY LOAD (lbs.)	COST/lb.
Shuttle	$375.0 million	55.00 K	$ 6,818
Titan IV	$178.0 million	39.10 K	$ 4,552
Titan 34D	$135.6 million	33.80 K	$ 4,012
Delta	$ 33.2 million	7.80 K	$ 4,256
Centaur	$ 59.0 million	12.30 K	$ 4,797
Scout	$ 10.0 million	.57 K	$17,544

*Per information obtained from NASA Librarian, 5 January 1989

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The Space Transportation Problem

This article will deal solely with the second stepping stone, the transportation problem from earth to space. I will talk about how we can transport people, pigs, or other cargoes into space in a manner, and at a price, that would lead to opening up this high frontier to many new uses, both military and civil, and how we can do this quickly and cheaply.

During the past year High Frontier — working with several of America's leading space system designers, rocket scientists, and engineers, and in collaboration with the Citizen's Advisory Council on Space Policy — has come up with what we believe to be a simple and effective solution to space transportation that can dramatically increase the Free World's access to space.

We are now convinced that we know how to reduce the cost of space transportation to under $50 per lb, that we can demonstrate this in less than 3 years time, and that this can be done with an annual investment of less than it now costs to carry out one single Shuttle Mission.

We now know how to make space travel costs compatible with air travel costs. But before I tell you how we can do this, and what it would mean to all of us if we did, let us briefly look at how we have been getting from earth into space until now and what this costs us.

In order to get from the surface of the earth to low earth orbit (LEO) all nations involved in space activities now use three types of vehicles: Disposable rockets known as Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELV's); multi-stage, partially recoverable vehicles such as Shuttles; and, still under development, airplanes able to fly to and from space such as those envisaged by the US National Aerospace Plane (NASP) project. At present all space programs, current or projected, plan to rely on one or more of these three systems or on advanced versions of them.

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PROTOTYPE PROGRAM SCHEDULE



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The Cost of Space Travel

Now let's look at what it costs to go from earth to LEO and back via these systems. As indicated on our chart, the cost ranges from $4000/lb by ELV's to about $8000/lb by shuttle vehicle. Obviously at these prices no one is going to do anything in space that is not worth the price of going there to do it. Very few free enterprise activities can now afford the trip, and at a time when there is such concern over the deficit, even government sponsored activities in space are underfunded or curtailed. In simple terms, space transportation costs have all but priced America and its major allies out their ability to exploit the vast benefits we might otherwise realize in space.

Why is space travel so expensive? Does it really have to be? A cursory examination suggests three obvious reasons for the high prices, one less obvious but extremely important reason, and two generally perceived but actually fallacious reasons.

The three obvious reasons are: First, the habit of throwing away all or part of the vehicles now used for the trip; second, the number of personnel now involved in the launch and recovery process – a field army of over 9000 people; and finally the highly specialized ports and ground equipment required to operate the space transportation system. This includes costly installations such as the Kennedy and Vandenberg space ports, gigantic gantries, and an extensive, worldwide, tracking and ground control net.

A less obvious but equally costly factor in the high price of space travel results from using families of vehicles that are unable to survive even minor failures, especially en route to LEO. The very high risk factor this introduces into space operations, and efforts to offset it, are reflected in specialized crew requirements, exotic materials, over inspection micromanagement, and heavy insurance costs.

In addition to the above, most casual observers seem to have a gut feeling that space travel vehicles must be vastly more expensive to manufacture than, say, transport aircraft

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SPACE	AMERICA	
Outer Space Treaty * U.N. Policies Collective, Public, Ownerships Government Management * Peaceful Uses	Common Law * Property Rights Land Grants * Free Enterprise Fundamental Rights Free Trade * Homestead	PRINCIPLES
Rockets * ELV's, RLV's Shuttle Vehicles Aerospace Planes	Long Boats * Clipper Ships Railroads * Prairie Schooner Trails and Highways	ACCESS
Assured Access * SDI * ASAT's * Space Ships Satellite Surveillance * Navigation Ports at Leo * Rescue Services Communications * Training	Protection - Forts, Cavalry, LOC Defenses Mopping * Mail * Rescue Services Airport and Port Facilities Communications * Training	SUPPORT
Exploration * Adventure * Colonies Mining * Manufacturing * Tourism Profits * Free Enterprise Activities Farming	Exploration * Adventure * Colonies Mining * Manufacturing * Tourism Profits * Free Enterprise Activities Farming	ACTIVITIES

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such as the 747. They also tend to believe that the energy (fuel) cost incurred in attaining orbital heights and velocities is a major factor in the transportation cost. Neither of these assumptions are true as we shall see.

The vehicles we rely upon today for all trips into space are modified military munitions. In the rush to catch up with Sputnik we literally put saddles on our ICBM's and have merely been improving on these ever since. High Frontier's Director, General Dan Graham, likes to refer to these as "disintegrating totem poles". But, whatever you call them they are not vehicles designed specifically for cost effective and safe transportation purposes.

Before I tell you just HOW we could greatly reduce these space travel costs let's see WHY it is important that we do so at this time. This will give us a feel for urgency and willingness to overcome the inevitable opposition to adopting the new approach we propose.

Why Travel Costs Must Be Reduced

There are four major political reasons for trying to get space transportation costs down to reasonable levels; three equally important economic reasons, and at least five national security reasons.

On the political side we will not be able to recover the US worldwide lead in space, at present costs, especially in today's deficit environment. We cannot hope to meet the aspirations of America's youth for opportunities in space unless and until we can provide a safe, economical and reliable means of access to this new frontier. And, we will not meet the desires of those who seek to advance human knowledge about the Universe.

A fourth, even more serious political concern that was recently brought out in a front page *New York Times* article, is that America could be shut out of space altogether should we be unlucky enough to have another Challenger-type accident. A recent NASA study referred to in the *Times* article, stated that the probability of this is at least 1 in 78

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This means it is a near certainty if we rely predominantly on our high risk aging shuttle fleet for all our major transportation needs over the next ten or more years.

On the economic side, US economic growth, and the associated standard of living in America, will depend to an increasing degree on space activities as we progress into the next century. Our democracy and its economic life is dependent on free enterprise. Free enterprise will have little or no possibility of competing with centralized governments for the use and exploitation of space so long as the cost of access remains as high as it is. And, space offers the potential for solving many growing shortages of critical energy and materials on earth. Solar power from satellites and raw materials obtainable on asteroids, are but two examples.

Last, but not least, long term US security is becoming increasingly dependent on space systems and capabilities.

The lift costs to LEO will be a major consideration in getting the numerous satellites required for the funds urgently needed for the near term deployment of the strategic defenses (SDI) essential to lasting deterrence, for protection from accidents or rogue missiles and insurance for START type treaties.

Space is the next high ground whose control in wartime will determine the outcome as was the case first with control of the seas, and later with control of the air. A broad US military space capability and a quick reaction into space may soon be essential if we are to insure that no other power can deny America access to space, whether in war or peace or for civil or military purposes.

Many satellite based systems could now help separate commands and activities such as those of the naval forces, overseas deployments, NATO, etc in their defense tasks if they could obtain these at a price compatible with the benefits they would confer.

Unless the U.S. maintains as extensive a presence and research program in space as any other nation it risks having others achieving technological breakthroughs or discoveries

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that they might later exploit against the U.S. on earth. With little or no established intelligence capability in space any such discoveries could easily be brought back, nurtured, and presented as a threat before the U.S. even learned about them – let alone reacted to them.

And vigorous exploitation of worldwide space based communications by the Free World could make a major contribution to breaking down barriers as between closed and open societies, thereby setting the stage for a lasting peace.

Finally, there is a very serious threat to America's ability to pursue new space ventures and to rely upon current those space based communications, intelligence, and other assets. This threat stems from its dependence on the high risk, costly, and limited Shuttle and ELV transport system. As previously mentioned, another shuttle explosion would undoubtedly all but terminate U.S. access to near space for several years. Today the U.S. has no safe, affordable, backup for the Shuttle, and the relatively few ELV's being built for NASA and the USAF.

The SSX – A Solution

Given the importance of doing all of the above and the progress made in recent years in structures and rocket engine technologies, we now can design and build a transport system, for travel to LEO, that is safe; man, women, and child rated; and roughly comparable in cost to modern commercial airplanes. This is what we can do, and do relatively cheaply and quickly, provided we are willing to adopt the same approach used for all other earth transport systems – that is design it from the ground up solely for transportation purposes.

High Frontier, its Space Council allies and rocket engineer colleagues, are now trying to get the U.S. to build and test three prototype models of such a vehicle. We are NOT suggesting that we abandon any present programs such as improved Shuttles, Space Planes, or very heavy lift Advanced Launch Systems (ALS). All we are asking is that a

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relatively inexpensive test program be funded to validate the feasibility and characteristics of the specialized low cost transportation vehicle we now know can be built.

The Transport vehicle that we propose be built and tested we call "Space Ship Experimental" – The SSX. It will be a Single Stage To Orbit And Return, rocket propelled vehicle, designed to emphasize the following characteristics:

-100% Recoverability – nothing thrown away

-Failure-safe equivalence to commercial aircraft

-Built for low cost, economic, flexible operations

-Free from expensive bases and ground equipment

-Turn around without refurbishment

-Man, women, and child rated as are commercial aircraft

In brief it will look and perform just like the space ships designed and written about by Jules Verne, Robert Heinlein, and all other visionary science fiction writers. Nine times out of ten their forecasts have been right, and this will be no exception!

Why Not Previously Built?

Now that I have told you *Why* this should be done and *How* it could be done let me explain *Why* it has *Not* been done. Given the general acceptance of the desirability of cutting transportation costs to space I am sure some of you are wondering, how is it that High Frontier is so smart on space lift when all the Government space agencies who also recognize the need to reduce costs, are so dumb?

Although the need to do this has been accepted from the dawn of the space age, the urgency of responding to the Soviet lead in the early 1960's, coupled with materials and

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knowhow of that time, dictated modifying missiles to get into space. In addition, cost was a secondary consideration since security was the primary concern and Government was footing the bill.

Then and for some years thereafter, structural designs, materials, and hence vehicle weights, and to a somewhat lesser extent rocket engine technology, made single stage to orbit systems less attractive (if not impractical) and dictated multi-stage vehicles especially for the then perceived payload requirements. Many variants of single stage rockets were examined over the past twenty years but none were built and tested.

The principle opposition to creating Single Stage systems is now more bureaucratic and political than it is technological. The thousands of people and numerous organizations and companies making a living off the present high cost, high risk, space transportation systems see the SSX as a major threat to their personal security, long term plans, budgets, and way of life. As a result many of these have been critical of the SSX proposal. The National Aerospace Plane program office sent the Vice President a paper saying our proposed SSX would not work before they even had been briefed on what the SSX was all about!

Comparing Space and Air Travel

The bottom line in all this is that there is no real technological reason why ground-to-space transportation costs cannot be reduced and the cost of this transportation made compatible with air travel on earth. A brief comparison of the building blocks that make up space travel systems with those of commercial air explains why this is the case:

-SSX vehicle structures should be no more expensive than those of large commercial aircraft.

-The amount and cost of the energy (fuel) required now to fly from the US to Melbourne is greater than that

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which will be required for the SSX to go from ground to LEO.

-The facilities now required to go to space, tremendous gantries and bases like Kennedy, are vastly more costly than the simple hard stands SSX will need.

-The standing army of 9000 to 15,000 people now required to support a shuttle flight is vastly more expensive than the 400 or less SSX will require.

-The extra costs imposed by the risk inherent in today's non-abortable systems are far greater than realized.

When the savings inherent in substituting a relatively risk free, fully recoverable, transportation system that is free from specialized bases and excessive control requirements are added up, the reduction in travel costs is dramatic. This is what will happen if we design our SSX solely for efficient transportation.

Advantages of the SSX System

Not only can we save vast amounts of money in travel costs by designing our SSX system specifically for this purpose but we can also acquire numerous new operating capabilities and advantages not now possible with today's modified munitions. The SSX will offer:

In system advantages:

-One stage to develop and test
-One stage to operate
-All azimuth launch capability
-No jettisoned stages or shrouds
-Intact safe abort during ascent
-Land almost anywhere, no runways required
-Rapid turn around, refuel and fly
-Complete mission or safe return with engine out

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-Total reusability. No refurbishing
-Easy step by step testing. Cheap to test
-High reliability by testing
-Minimum ground crew and facilities
-High space performance.
-No space debris hazards

In operational mission capabilities.

-Manned or unmanned cargo and people transport
-Low cost, rapid access, to orbital systems
-Space defense interceptor capabilities
-Logistic support for orbital systems
-Advanced technology test and demonstrations
-Space system assembly, servicing, or recovery
-Fly Transfer maneuvers to higher orbits
-Planetary and space science probes
-Materials processing in space
-Space station and space tourism roles
-Servicing lunar settlements
-Not now affordable military activities
-The ability to land anywhere it can fly to

All the above tasks being naturally subject to adequate on board fuel or in-space refueling if necessary and available.

The SSX will be an all-purpose, economical transportation vehicle that can be operated much like a commercial aircraft and with roughly equivalent safety whether manned or unmanned.

Likely Opposition to The SSX Proposal

Obviously any new program has opposition. Based on our experience with SDI it seems likely that the four principal hurdles we will have to overcome are the inherent resistance of all large civil or military organizations to changing the way they do business; the opposition of all those now supported by, hence having a vested interests in, present systems that are threatened by the SSX; the "requir-

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ements syndrome" in all bureaucracies, and probable objections from the Soviet's and/or their U.S. fellow travelers.

Please note that I did not list as likely opponents experts that claimed the SSX concept could not be achieved from a technological feasibility point of view. In recent years technological progress has eliminated most of the technological constraints that made the Single Stage systems unattractive or perceived to be unattractive. Structural advances resulting from efforts to improve the ICBM systems turned transports, coupled with research for shuttle and National Aerospace Plane concepts, has brought the state of the art up to the point wherein such vehicles are now both attractive and potentially cost effective.

Resistance to changes that pose a threat to existing programs, activities, jobs, role, missions, or other vested interests is a well known phenomenon. SDI has been a victim of this for years. This resistance is especially acute when it comes to changes that involve not merely hardware but a paradigm shift to a different way of doing the "business".

The requirements phenomena occur especially within organizations where all below the level of top management think only in terms of meeting whatever requirements have been handed down to them. They therefore judge any proposal only on the basis of whether or not it will help to meet these already established needs or requirements, and reject it if it does not do so.

In the case of space transportation there is a large and long bibliography of assumed lift requirements to be met by existing systems over the next decade. Military satellites, space platform parts, civil communication systems, etc. Government worker audiences look at the payloads they have been told to plan transportation for in the foreseeable future and say: "You're SSX may work as you say but this is academic for it is not relevant to most of our foreseeable payload requirements, therefore, we cannot waste money on developing it."

This typical bureaucratic attitude ignores the fact that

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requirements are set by potential users with an eye to feasibility of fulfillment. At $8000/lb no field commander is going to call in a requirement for a dedicated space system to support his mission. Likewise, Mr. Marriott is not going to look at, let alone invest in, an orbital hotel for weekend space tourists at these prices.

At $50/lb new and as yet unthought of requirements would pour in. This chicken and egg situation has always been a major hurdle to getting government support for new ideas or approaches. We have already run into it in briefing defense department staffers on the SSX even when these should logically welcome cheaper lift.

Finally it is fair to assume we can expect some form of Soviet objections to any U.S. investment or program that could result in our leapfrogging ahead of them in space. They will also see the implications for free enterprise development of space which they had hoped to preclude in the UN 1967 treaty on Outer Space and possibly the threat to any aspirations they may have towards acquiring ultimate space control.

When the Soviets take a position, we know from SDI experience that all the U.S. fellow travelers such as the Pugwash Charles River crowd and the Union of Confused Scientists will leap into the fray to poor mouth SSX. What form their objections will take, however, is not clear. It will be interesting to see how Dr. Sagan handles an attack on a proposal that could make his pet deep space exploratory aspirations cheap enough to be pursued in earnest.

Actions Required to Prove Out SSX

What can we do to realize the benefits of a cheap transportation system as proposed? First, we must get official and public understanding that cheap transportation to space can in fact be had and why. This includes a decision maker-SSX advocate-within Government. Ideally this would be the Vice President as head of the Space Council. Whomever it is it must be someone able to respond to public demand that

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bureaucratic protectionism be overruled and the SSX concept be, at minimum, tested.

Second we must get an approved and funded SSX prototype development program underway, preferably under the auspices of some qualified government agency. This could be done under any of several agencies now charged with space activities were they directed to so. Alternately, we could possibly interest private investors or corporations to build the SSX prototype systems with a view to the massive potential profits these portend if they work as planned. It also might be possible to interest industries in some allied nation to take on the development effort. The benefits to their country coupled with the relative lack of bureaucratic resistance and red tape they enjoy could make such an investment attractive. Whatever the approach, it is clearly more important that it be done than who does it.

The amount of money needed to prove out the system is not excessive when it comes to any of the above sponsorships for a development program. We are looking at about $200 million to get to the point, in less than 2 years, where we will know whether we can build the system with little or no risk of failures. This amount could be found within the R&D budgets of several of the above US departments.

The total estimated cost of actually building and demonstrating three test space transportation vehicles is about one billion over three to four years. This is literally "peánuts" in comparison with other space efforts, or in comparison with the potential benefits and profits. The chart shows what we consider to be a conservative program with expenditures at each stage.

One thing is clear. The first time someone demonstrates a flight up and back with an SSX, all existing space transport systems will go out of business in due course and everyone will turn to our approach for all their future needs. Even a test flight that took an SSX prototype up a few feet and back down would shake up any audience. And, from our point of view such a system would make it easy for a first Phase SDI

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to be deployed, tested, and hence accepted under today's tight budgets.

The SSX would open up vast new technological research efforts and programs, allow field commanders space systems of their own, and no doubt drive the Soviets up the wall — for they would have to divert money from military threats to space transports, or buy ours, either of which would be a good deal!

Supporters of a program to prove that cheap transportation to Low Earth Orbit can now be had by building single stage to orbit rocket powered transportation vehicles should not have to fight the technical feasibility battle as did the supporters of SDI. We have the world's best rocket engineers on our side to do this for us. All we need to do is to generate the demand for such a system and overcome the opposition of vested interests in the disintegrating totem poles and ICBM's with saddles they now use for space travel.

If only officials or potential investor/developers will admit that they would like to see an SSX transport system built, with its economies in travel costs, *Provided* it is technically feasible as we claim, High Frontier Inc. will be happy to send its experts up against any who question this, for we are confident we will win.

So, let's get with it and recover for the Free World the lead in space which we had right after the Apollo moon landing. If we were to do this, you and I might be able to afford a weekend in orbit before we buy a ticket to eternity in a stone orchard on earth.

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PERESTROIKA IN EASTERN EUROPE

Stephen R. Bowers
James Madison University

Today, both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are locked in domestic battles over the nature and extent of a dramatic reform process that touches on the economic and political foundations of the region. It is the economic inadequacies of Marxism-Leninism that are driving East European communist party regimes to pursue economic reforms that will allow them to, at a minimum, increase levels of popular consumption and, perhaps, thus avoid the necessity for extensive political reforms. Some East European leaders believe that economic and political reforms support each other and that political reforms must be undertaken in order to remove many of the impediments to economic change. The dominant view, however, is that economic reform does not require political change and, in fact, insulates unpopular regimes from the necessity for political changes that might have a de-stabilizing impact on regimes which often lack deep popular support.

Two basic patterns may be discerned from an examination of the official East European reaction to pressures for reform, pressures that arise from both domestic sources as well as from the influence of the USSR on its allies. The most clearly responsive model is that of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party under the leadership of Karoly Grosz. The model for resistance to pressures for as well as to the process of reform is the German Democratic Republic's Socialist Unity Party (SED) under the leadership of an aging Erich Honecker. The rest of the region is increasingly divided into two camps. The pro-reformist camp consists of Poland and, to a very limited and primarily verbal extent, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia and Romania are firmly anti- reformist and

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their leaderships are in the process of consolidating their positions in order to resist growing domestic pressures for both economic and political reforms.

Economic and Political Reforms in East Europe

The greatest diversity among the East European communist party states exists with regard to the question of political reforms. While there is something of a consensus about economic reforms, sharp divisions exist about the necessity and dimensions of political reform. Hungary, as mentioned above, has been the most eager to pursue political reforms that involve at least some experimentation with multiparty politics. The Polish leadership is also sympathetic to this view and has embarked on similar policies. Elsewhere in the region there has been limited support for pluralist experiments. East Germany is the outstanding model of resistance with Czechoslovakia and Romania equally committed to a continuation of one party rule. Bulgarian authorities give lip-service but little more to the idea of political reform.

Public expressions of support for many of the ideas embodied in Gorbachev's reforms have been frequent although actual demonstrations of an adherence to those ideas have been rare. For example, in 1989 at the Vienna review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the nations of East Europe gave formal support to an international effort to increase the wider, freer dissemination of information when they signed an East-West agreement for the protection of human rights, including freedom of association, religion, travel and emigration. This agreement represents the most significant guarantee of human rights since the signing of the Helsinki accords in 1975.[1] Yet, it came at a time when many of the signatories were involved in determined efforts to crack down on dissidents and suppress the genuine demands for reform that have been generated from their societies.

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Hungary

The starting point for an examination of reforms in East Europe must be a review of the measures that have been undertaken by the East European regimes which have embraced the Soviet calls for *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Clearly recognized as the leader in developing new methods of leadership and management is the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP). HSWP General Secretary Janos Kadar began a very cautious reform program less than a decade after the brutal Soviet intervention of 1956 which ended the country's first plunge into reformist politics, Imry Nagy's ill-fated effort to institute a multi-party system and withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Kadar's "Alliance Policy", founded on the notion of government by cooperation rather than coercion, was endorsed by the party congress in 1962 and set the stage for a program of modest liberalization, inner-party democracy, amnesties for convicted "counter-revolutionaries", and recruitment of non-party specialists for leadership positions in administrative and economic ministries. The solution for Hungary's political problems, the leadership eventually made clear, was the adoption of economic reforms that would give Hungarians a standard of living sufficient to divert their attention from the political shortcomings of their system. The key to the success of the "Alliance Policy" was the development of popular support for the regime, support based not on a sense of legitimacy but simply on a recognition of the system's ability to deliver economic benefits.[2]

By the time Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the Soviet Union, two decades of slow-paced reforms found Hungary suffering from the impact of serious energy shortages, brought on by increases in the price of Soviet oil, and demoralized by economic and social pressures that seemed to highlight the need for more extensive, fundamental reforms. The Hungary of the mid-1980s was torn by the contradictions between the professed ideals of socialist society and the grim reality of daily life in a country that faced the

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problems of capitalist society without the material advantages associated with that system. Housing shortages, low salaries, inflation, drug abuse, and, for some, even unemployment were distinctive features of life in Hungary three decades after the destruction of the nation's first reform effort. Kadar's economic reforms, initially launched in 1968 as the New Economic Mechanism, floundered in the 1970s and were renewed in 1983 as the regime resorted to decentralization, modern technology, and market forces in an effort to stimulate a stagnant economy. Yet, that effort failed, jeopardizing the few gains that citizens did enjoy and creating a two class society divided between those who got money through private ventures and those forced to rely upon their regular incomes. By 1987, almost 40% of the population earned incomes that placed them below the official subsistence level. The weak foundations of the "Alliance Policy" — its reliance on the maintenance of a comfortable standard of living as the basis of regime support — finally collapsed, producing a profound crisis that had economic, ideological and political implications.

A widespread belief that the state administration was incapable of promoting effective change stimulated demands for a major restructuring of the nation's economic system. By the mid-1980s, the Party was actively considering radical economic reforms and engaging in candid and even blunt discussions that would not have even been possible earlier. In January, 1988, the chairman of the Hungarian Economic Chamber, Tamas Beck, in analyzing Hungary's economic plight, denounced "poor economic development...and the insecurity prevailing in the foreign economic balance" as key factors in weakening Hungary's financial situation and in lowering its standard of living. "This situation", he declared, "severely tries the tolerance of society...and warns us that...the economy must show results...." In short, what had become necessary was a reform of the reforms that Kadar had initiated in the 1960s.[3]

Events of 1988 demonstrated that the HSWP recognized

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the country's predicament and was willing to undertake drastic measures to provide a remedy. This willingness was undoubtedly reinforced by a realization that Hungary's national crisis had not only the economy but also the party firmly in its grip. The disintegration of the party was reflected in an apathy among the membership that frequently forced local party secretaries to beg members to attend meetings, even when they were held only once or twice a year. By the spring of 1988 it was obvious that Janos Kadar, at the age of 76 and having ruled for over three decades, was unable to lead the party but was also unwilling to relinquish his authority. Kadar's refusal to recognize the condition to which the system had declined made him an impediment to the very reform process that he had initiated. Since it appeared Hungary was approaching a point at which the refusal to implement significant structural reform and the inability to reverse the economic decline that started in 1985 might compel the party to once again rule by force of arms, a special HSWP national conference removed the aging Kadar and replaced him with 58 year old Karoly Grosz, Hungarian Prime Minister since 1987 and highly regarded for the programs he had undertaken in an effort to change Hungary's economic fortunes during his year as Prime Minister. At the same time the conference reduced the size of the Politburo from 13 to 11 members, removing eight incumbents and bringing in six new and generally younger members, thus reducing the average age from 60 to 52. The inclusion in the Politburo of Rezso Nyers and Imry Pozsgay, both leading advocates of extensive political and economic reforms, indicated the determination of the party conference to promote fundamental changes.[4]

In an interview with the Soviet journal *Argumenty I Fakty*, shortly after his elevation to General Secretary of the HSWP, Grosz evaluated the progress of current reforms, including the tough economic stabilization plan that he implemented in 1987 following his appointment as Prime Minister, and outlined his plans for more extensive reform efforts. First,

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according to Grosz, in the six months since the HSWP implemented economic reform measures, the economy had begun to show definite signs of improvement and the first months of 1988, a time in which exports to capitalist nations increased by more than 40% in comparison with early 1987, were a clear statement of the correctness of the party's reform moves. At the same time, even though consumer supplies continue to be a problem, Hungary's budget deficit has fallen by 10%, raising official hopes of a halt in the country's rising foreign debt. Second, future economic growth will be aided by an official willingness to accept "liquidation of loss-making enterprises", something already possible under Hungarian law but not undertaken by the Kadar regime. This process will be supported by a wage reform and a reorganization of the state-administrative apparatus that will provide for decentralization and the transfer of administrative functions to the public. While boasting that the government had "done a great deal in the last six months", Grosz conceded that the "reforms are still only scratching the surface...." Yet, he explained, "we have introduced a new spirit and brought capable young people into responsible posts." In response to a question about the connection between restructuring in the USSR and the process of renewal in Hungary, Grosz declared that he could not remember when Hungarians had shown "such sympathy for the USSR and its leaders" although there were differences between the two country's situations. The key difference, he explained, is that the USSR is simultaneously pursuing both economic and political reforms while Hungary has been involved only in the former. However, the parallel implementation of both types of reform in the Soviet Union, in his view, "increases the chance of success", something which is of "enormous significance... for the development of Hungarian political reform." Grosz also praised the USSR's "new foreign policy thinking" because it allows Hungary "greater freedom of action."[5]

In recognition of the existence of this new freedom of

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action, Hungarian authorities recognized that their reform efforts are a common concern of others in Eastern Europe, especially the Poles. A Hungarian statement on the twentieth anniversary of the Hungarian-Polish agreement on friendship and mutual assistance in 1988 acknowledged that the situations of the two nations were similar in that each was involved in an effort to implement major reforms. Commenting on the Polish observation that Eastern Europe has two alternatives: reform or reform, a Hungarian editorial declared that reform is inevitable and that Hungarians and Poles are "anxiously following" their common efforts and are "as much as possible, helping each other."[6] The closeness of the Hungarian and Polish reform efforts remains unique in Eastern Europe as most of the other communist party states are reluctant to make such decisive moves.

The Hungarian commitment to economic restructuring led to the opening of the Hungarian Management Center, a business school offering a one-year program of study dedicated not to traditional Marxist-Leninist economic practices but to Western capitalist managerial techniques and philosophies. According to the center's director, Zsuzanna Ranski, if Hungary "is going to compete with the West, we need to learn their techniques. Lack of good management is one of our main problems."[7] The government's agreement in 1988 to a free-trade pact with the European Economic Community is another indication of official interest in private enterprise. Western commercial ties are now crucial and, perhaps, more vital than economic relations with the CMEA. The increasing importance of economic ties with Western Europe was underscored in 1988 when loans from the Federal Republic of Germany saved Hungary from bankruptcy. In January, 1989, Hungary also made provisions to allow complete foreign ownership of local firms, an unprecedented measure designed to encourage Western investment in the Hungarian economy.[8]

While Grosz commented in May, 1988, that Hungary could successfully implement economic reforms without

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engaging in major political reforms, long a key point of Hungarian reform efforts, pressure for political changes grew rapidly following his selection as General Secretary. One of the signals of this pressure was an essay written by the philosopher and political scientist Attila Agh, who wrote of the "substantive linkage between socialism and democracy" and declared that a delay in proceeding with political change would "only increase crisis phenomena." Although the changed role of the Hungarian parliament was a step in this direction, a meaningful reform, Agh insisted, will not be possible without a concomitant reform of the party's leading role.[9]

Hungary's plunge into political reforms that affect the party's role was marked by several events that in the not too distant past might have prompted Soviet military pressures or worse. The first step in the regime's effort to overcome the political crisis was the officially sanctioned creation of numerous independent, non-communist political organizations. In a short time there were dozens of movements and parties actively and successfully recruiting adherents. Not only new movements but even old ones quickly became part of Hungary's newly enshrined system of "socialist pluralism". The Smallholders Party, which was the majority party from 1945 until 1948, the National Peasant Party, and the Social Democratic Party were among the old parties making a reappearance in 1988. In the view of Mihaly Bihari, a political science lecturer at Budapest University who in Kadar's last hours was expelled from the HSWP for having maintained contact with the opposition, it is the Social Democratic Party which will be the nation's biggest party under a multi-party system because some 100,000 HSWP members would be prepared to join it.[10] New parties and party-like organizations include the rural People's Party, formerly known as the Peter Veres Society, the New March Front, the Network of Free Initiative, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The political ideals of those opposed to the general direction

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of change in Hungary are advanced by the Ferenz Muennich Society, a group of hardliners brought together by their continuing support of the HSWP's old leadership and the principles democratic centralism and, who, ironically, are taking at least some advantage of the reforms they oppose. A number of apparently genuine interest groups were also created for special constituencies. For example, the Federation of Young Democrats and the Szarszo Front represent Hungarian youth and students while the Democratic Trade Union of Academic and Scientific Workers and Worker Solidarity 89 are the best known of the four independent trade unions. The growing vitality of the labor movement could be seen on the eve of price increases in January, 1989, when thousands of workers held a ten minute "warning strike" to protest those increases. Formation of the Danube Movement, which works to protect the Danube and its environment, illustrates the strength of Hungary's ecological movement. By early in 1989, opposition groups were involved in negotiations with the HSWP over the specific nature of their participation in government. Yet, there are limits to this dramatic process. According to Minister of State Imry Pozsgay, while Hungary is in fact "proceeding towards the multi-party system, the organizational conditions of a real alternative multi-party system do not yet exist." The problems associated with the early negotiations between the HSWP and the new organizations demonstrate the difficulties of creating effective organizational conditions.[11]

The most explosive political reforms, however, are symbolic ones, most notably the dispute over the significance of Hungary's 1956 effort to implement sweeping political change. In the official version, the revolt of 1956 was simply a "counter-revolution" whose leaders bore full responsibility for the Soviet Union's subsequent invasion. In recent years, the effort to bring about a re-evaluation of the 1956 revolt has been pursued by political figures such as Imry Poszgay and independent groups such as the Committee for Historical Justice. Advocates of this process argue that it is long

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overdue, if only because the progress that has been made since 1956 is a consequence of what happened during the administration of Imry Nagy. Poszgay and his allies describe the events of 1956 as a "revolution", a word which leads to the logical conclusion that what followed 1956 was the true counter-revolution and the so-called "heroes of the struggle against counter-revolution" were the enemies of progress. Although as yet unresolved, the open debate over this question demonstrates the strong tendency toward modification of the orthodox view. An important indication of the changing official view of the revolt was the action by the Hungarian Presidential Council in December, 1988 in giving pardons to 120 people who had been condemned for their actions in 1956. The Council's statement did not change the official view of the events but simply noted that since "thirty years have passed, it is unnecessary for these people to continue to bear the disadvantages of a criminal record."[12]

Questions about the interpretation of the turbulent events of 1956 have generated a long and often bitter debate about the fate of Imry Nagy and others in the Hungarian leadership at that time. In June, 1988, the newly founded Committee for Historical Justice issued an appeal calling for the complete rehabilitation of all those who were victims of post-1956 repressions and demanded special recognition for Imry Nagy and the circle of close advisors who died with him. On the 30th anniversary of the executions, June 16, 1988, there was a large demonstration in Budapest organized to demand the rehabilitation of Nagy and his associates. The police response to the demonstration was especially brutal and served as a reminder to the limits imposed on the re-examination of Hungarian history. In spite of this action, widely viewed as a setback to the efforts of Karoly Grosz to build a more liberal image for his regime, advocates of a reappraisal of the 1956 revolution continued to press their demands and focused on what many saw as the minimal requirement of decency, the removal of the bodies of the most prominent victims from their unmarked, overgrown

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plots in Rakoskeresztur Cemetery. The Central Committee's decision in January, 1989, to finally provide a proper public burial for the bodies of Imry Nagy and several of his colleagues and the actual removal of their remains in March are the strongest indications of an official willingness to make a dramatic symbolic gesture to Hungary's opposition. The decision, described by a Committee for Historical Justice Statement as only a "first step", has implications which are more than symbolic in that it sets the stage for a continuing inquiry into the roles of numerous prominent Hungary politicians as well as the conduct of the Soviet Union during that period. While the Soviet-Hungarian relationship will undoubtedly survive this process, especially as the USSR itself is re-examining its own history, the impact on the cohesion of the HSWP is likely to be more disruptive. "[13]

Poland

Like Hungary, Poland has a long tradition of experimenting with reforms and, also like Hungary, this tradition serves to remind the leadership of the consequences of failed reforms. Although its sufferings have not equalled those of the Hungarians, Poland has felt the impact of upheavals associated with the suppression of Solidarity in 1981 as well as with the turbulent events of 1956 and 1970. Yet, this is a nation that has once again embarked on a reformist course. The pressure for reforms grew as the country's economic difficulties mounted and by 1988 public dissatisfaction was expressed in a series of strikes that forced official concessions to the country's increasingly outspoken opposition groups.

A series of measures designed to alleviate Poland's economic difficulties were the first official concessions. By 1988 the government was implementing an economic plan that reduced state subsidies, demanded greater efficiency, and required an adherence to market mechanisms. The practical consequence of this policy was a dramatic increase in the prices of basic goods and services and an inflation rate of 80% by 1989 with the prospect of further increases by 1990.

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With meat not only expensive but also rationed and clothing costs that make new clothing a luxury, most Poles cannot live without resorting to various black market maneuvers in an effort to meet minimum requirements. The labor unrest that resulted in strikes in the spring and then again in August was a disruptive reminder of the inadequacy of government policies. Recognizing that almost nothing would significantly improve Poland's short-term economic situation, the government desperately sought measures that would lead to some eventual improvements. On January 1, 1989, it instituted measures that encouraged Western investment by allowing, for the first time, 100% foreign ownership of Polish enterprises. Poland's only hope now for bringing its economy out of an almost permanent slide is to establish ties with the West that will allow it to borrow some of the prosperity of Western Europe and the United States. A reorganization of the Polish National Bank and the creation of nine new commercial banks to encourage competition with the state banking system encourage these overtures toward the West. Yet, the party remains unable to implement a truly fundamental change in the economy, a shortcoming which was illustrated by the government's failure to reach an agreement on indexing wages to the inflation rate, an important reform sought by opposition leaders who see this as the only way to avoid further labor unrest.[14] Both economic and political matters are the focus of Polish reform proposals. With Poland operating under its 1952 Constitution, there is widespread speculation about the failure of a constitution that was modeled after the USSR's 1936 Stalin Constitution. According to a 1988 analysis of this issue, the "35-year period of operation of the Polish system of government based on the 1952 Constitution justifies the harsh criticism leveled at it." Indeed, the failure of the system is so complete that it is difficult to "separate defects inherent in that system... from deviations occurring in practice." In view of this, the leadership of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) is now preparing for a "presidential-parliamentary" system of

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government that would establish a "socialist democracy" based on the principle of political freedom, a representative system of government, and a strong, efficient executive to replace Poland's collective head of state.[15]

Speculation about political reform also touches directly on the role of the PUWP. A first concern is the party's supervisory function, something which numerous party leaders admit is being performed poorly, especially at the level of the basic party organizations. By 1988 party leaders as well as non-party activists were in agreement about the need for a modification of the party's administrative mission.[16] A second and more fundamental concern is for the negative impact of the political monopoly enjoyed by the party. In his television debate with PUWP Central Committee member Alfred Miodowicz in November, 1988, Lech Walesa observed that all of the communist party states of East Europe are faced with a crisis because of the "monopoly in political affairs, the monopoly in union affairs, and the monopoly in economic affairs..." Declaring that history would judge them harshly if they did not take advantage of the situation to introduce systems which "have passed the test... everywhere else in the world", Walesa argued that Poland should emulate the Soviets who are "doing what Solidarity has been fighting for...."[17]

The move toward an elimination of the party's political monopoly began with the registration of numerous new, non-party associations. Most of the groups chartered in early 1988 espoused modest and frequently cultural goals that did not directly challenge party policies.[18] A more meaningful concession came in September when authorities gave permission for a general meeting of the Polish PEN Club, an association of Polish writers that had been banned for seven years. At this meeting, the PEN board adopted a resolution supporting talks between the government and representatives of popular organizations and calling for the reactivation of Solidarity.[19] The most significant step away from a party monopoly of political power was the agreement by the

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government to enter into a series of "round-table" discussions with the Citizens' Committee, a group of independent intellectuals and Solidarity activists. The purpose of the "round-table", which was divided into several working groups responsible for specific functional areas, was to bring the government together with members of the opposition in order to resolve differences over various reform issues. A specific objective of the talks was to resolve the question of how Solidarity might be legalized and what role the minority can play in the Polish governmental system. A fundamental assumption supporting these meetings was, first, that Solidarity would be legalized and, second, that the government would establish a freely elected Senate in which the opposition would be represented.[20] After two months of negotiations, the "round-table" talks led to what many regard as one of Eastern Europe's most sweeping reform measures. On April 5, 1989, the government and members of the Citizens' Committee reached an agreement that provided for the legalization of Solidarity and for free elections to Poland's new two-chamber legislative body. Elections to the Polish Senate, the weaker of the two chambers, are scheduled for June, 1989 and are based on completely open elections while the PUWP is guaranteed sixty percent of the seats in the Sejm, the more powerful lower chamber. The agreement also calls for the creation of a powerful presidency to head the reformed governmental system and contains a pledge by the regime to sanction an opposition media with a daily newspaper as well as access to television and radio. Authorities have agreed to a continuation of the "round-table" talks in order to discuss the reorganization of local government, a reform of the Polish legal system, and an ambitious program for dealing with the country's mounting ecological problems.[21]

Yet, in spite of these impressive accomplishments, there are important qualifications about the progress of reform in Poland. The first is the questionable legal significance of the "round-table" which Solidarity views as the primary vehicle

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for decision-making in contemporary Polish political affairs. The Citizens' Committee insists that its decisions have complete legal force. Polish authorities, on the other hand, have an ambivalent attitude about the legal relevance of the discussions and have suggested that they produce advisory opinions that will be considered by the regime. Responding to hardliners' fears that the PUWP was relinquishing its authority, Secretary General Wojciech Jaruzelski assured a meeting of party activists on March 11, 1989 that the party will retain its central role in Poland's political and social affairs. According to Jaruzelski, the party is not losing control but is refining its leadership qualities to insure that "our people" continue to govern even though the rules have been altered. The second qualification was expressed by Professor Wojciech Wrzesinski, vice-chairman of the Polish Historical Association, who recently complained that there is still a "difference between verbal assurances of increased democracy and what is actually being done on a daily basis." In Wrzesinski's view, the traditional mechanisms of authoritarian rule have been preserved because of the continuing efforts of those who have a "fear of a radical reform of political life." A final reservation exists because of popular reactions to the "round-table" process itself. In public opinion polls most citizens express little interest in the "round-table", in spite of the enormous media attention it has received, and have little faith that the reforms will significantly improve their lives. In view of the necessity for broad popular support for the success of pluralistic reforms and the fact of opposition to the new agreements by both hardline elements of the regime as well as members of the radical opposition who question Walesa's leadership, it would seem that a perilously small segment of Polish society has a genuine commitment to make the system work. In the absence of such a commitment, the Polish political crisis is not likely to be resolved.[22]

The often violent and Stalinist spirit that pervades much of Poland's political life justifies a final qualification about the Polish reform process. The death of Reverend Stefan

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Niedzielak in 1989, illustrated the depth of resistance to the process of political reform in Poland. An early supporter of the independent social movement that became Solidarity, Niedzielak was noted for his patriotic sermons and his tireless efforts to preserve the memory of the officially "forgotten" Polish soldiers who died in combat against Soviet forces which invaded eastern Poland in 1939 as well as the victims of the Katyn massacre. On January 21st, Reverend Niedzielak was murdered in his Warsaw church. Although Church representatives reported that he had been severely beaten, police investigators implied that Niedzielak might have died as a result of an unfortunate accident. The confused and contradictory statements issued by police officials fueled public suspicions that authorities were attempting to suppress information about the crime and reminded Polish activists of the death of dissident sociologist Jan Strzelecki who was killed on a remote highway in July, 1988. Police eventually announced the arrests of two men who had allegedly attempted to rob Strzelecki but issued no further reports on the disposition of the case. A few days after Niedzielak's death, another activist priest, Father Stanislaw Suchowolec, was found dead in his church near Bialystok. Suchowolec, who said his efforts were inspired by the work of Father Jerzy Popieluszko, the priest who was murdered by officers of the Polish security police in 1984, died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning caused by a fire that swept through his apartment.[23]

Bulgaria

The National Conference of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in January, 1988 put the Bulgarian leadership on record in support of the most basic reform concepts being advanced by the Soviet leadership. Long regarded as the most loyal of Soviet allies by virtue of deep historic, linguistic, and cultural ties, the BCP reaffirmed that reputation both at the Conference and at the Central Committee Plenum which preceded it. At the Plenum, General Secretary Todor

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Zhivkov declared that Bulgaria "cannot advance unless we look at the truth, unless we restructure the work of our party...." While asserting that the BCP would always be guided by the principle of democratic centralism, Zhivkov explained that, in the future, this principle "will be applied in a new manner." In his meetings with French President Francois Mitterand early in 1989, Zhivkov emphasized his commitment to restructuring and fully supported Gorbachev's reform policies. Other leading figures in the regime, such as Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, First Deputy Defense Minister, have given added force to this commitment with their enthusiastic endorsements of Gorbachev's initiatives and their calls for a complete restructuring of the "entire socialist society."[24]

The BCP's treatment of the ideological questions of *perestroika* is comprehensive and direct, offering a clear analysis of the fundamental questions of restructuring the role of the party. The starting point for this re-evaluation of the party's functions is the proposition that "without the democratization of socialist society there can be no successful development of socialism...." In practical terms this leads to the conclusion that while centralism, the dominant feature of most East European parties, can "make miracles" under "extreme circumstances", under other circumstances it becomes a potential "threat to the normal functioning of socialism." For example, the "cult of personality" developed on the basis of an existing monopoly of power, a monopoly that was "based on strong uncontrolled centralism." In the presence of such a political monopoly, there can be neither a free exchange of opinions nor an elimination of, "contradictions within socialist society", leading inevitably to a situation in which those contradictions become "antagonistic". Antagonistic contradictions, the BCP leadership insists, have produced problems such as those in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Quoting Lenin, the party leaders call for a "democratic atmosphere within the party." Quoting Marx, the BCP ideological specialists explain that the

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proletariat, after assuming power must "formulate the type of mechanism which would protect it from its own representatives and administrators" and insist that the BCP has now undertaken a policy of renovation that will insure adherence to the teachings of both Marx and Lenin.[25]

The leadership's explicit treatment of philosophical issues, however, has not been matched by specific measures that affect the conduct of Bulgarian political life. The simple, direct statements above have yet to be fully translated into policy. Economic reforms, for example, have been limited to an increase in economic contacts with the West through such ventures as the joint company founded with Volkswagen early in 1988 and the establishment of a joint stock company with Great Britain in 1989. While the government has promised new legislation on tax reform and the pricing system, new measures are yet to be implemented. The most substantial moves have been the creation of a new system of basic salaries in order to reward skilled professionals and a plan to institute the "firm" as the basic management unit. The latter innovation probably offers the greatest potential for improving Bulgaria's economic situation. Under this plan, there will be considerable freedom for private commercial initiatives and shares and bonds will be issued to the public. The "firm" should also attract foreign investment although it does little, to satisfy what Bulgarian workers have described in an official survey as their greatest desires in restructuring: self-management and the transference of socialist property to work teams for management and control. Even more importantly, current plans do nothing to overcome the alienation of workers' in Bulgaria's troubled state-run enterprises, something generally seen as the country's greatest problem.[26]

Even less progress has been evident in the enactment of political and related reforms on human rights issues. The most significant independent movement in Bulgaria is the Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights which was founded in January, 1988. Dedicated to promoting changes in laws on citizenship and travel, the abolition of

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laws against "antisocialist propaganda", and the forced assimilation of Bulgaria's Turkish minority, the group has a membership of only 130. The appearance of an apparent opposition stimulated authorities to mount a determined campaign aimed at the complete suppression of dissident environmentalists and intellectuals. In November, 1988, the Association's chairman and secretary were placed under house arrest while others associated with the group became the targets of official efforts to expel them from Bulgaria.[27]

With authorities involved in increasing ideological pressures and working to suppress the growth of dissident activities, little credence is given to the party's declarations of a plan for restructuring Bulgarian cultural and intellectual life. On March 27, 1988, the BCP Politburo adopted a resolution that declared the party's complete commitment to a process of restructuring that reflects a recognition of the crucial place in Bulgarian society of scientists, artists, engineers, teachers, physicians, journalists and others involved in intellectual work. The result of this new policy, the Politburo declared, would be a "comprehensive upsurge and development of intellectual life and the expansion of the nation's intellectual wealth." Yet, within a few weeks, Zhivkov, evidently concerned about Bulgarian publications that were imitating *glasnost*-inspired Soviet journals, denounced the appearance of material in the press that was provoking a "negative attitude about certain values and ideals of socialism". In addition, he declared that laws permitting the formation of new, independent groups should not be interpreted as a license to encourage "anarchy". These declarations were coupled with yet another step in the tightening of surveillance over dissident intellectuals who were supposed to have enjoyed at least some benefits from the BCP's new policy on intellectual and cultural restructuring.[28]

Others who have been effusive in their praise of restructuring, such as Colonel General Khristo Dobrev who, in January, 1989, spoke glowingly of "new trends in interna-

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tional relations", have qualified their support of change by offering cautionary words about the existence of an "opposite trend" among the "ruling circles of the U.S. and the NATO member countries...." The existence of this tendency, Dobrev insists, requires the Warsaw Pact states to "persist in our efforts to strengthen the defense of the socialist community...." Such inconsistencies, coupled with a new wave of repression, encourage a belief that Bulgaria's expressions of support for *perestroika* lack real substance.[29] An apparent effort by the Soviets to cultivate a successor to Zhivkov, whose imminent departure has been the subject of considerable speculation, indicates that there is deep Soviet dissatisfaction with Bulgarian affairs. Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Chudomir Aleksandrov, who visited Moscow in May of 1988, was the person evidently favored by the Kremlin. Aleksandov's ambitions, however, ended within a matter of weeks as he was forced to resign from his posts following disclosure of a family scandal. His resignation was followed by that of Politburo member Stanko Todorov and the dismissal of Central Committee Secretary Stoyan Mihaylov, both Zhivkov rivals. In December, two other leading figures suspected of opposition to Zhivkov were also dismissed from their positions. As a consequence of this series of retirements, resignations, and removals, Zhivkov now rules over a Politburo composed largely of hardliners who are personally allied with Zhivkov and politically committed to a fundamentally non-reformist course that utilizes the rhetoric of reform.[30]

Opposition to Reforms

It was once felt that the emergence of genuine diversity in Eastern Europe would lead to pluralistic reforms designed to stimulate sluggish economies and activate indifferent and cynical masses. Yet, as an era of diversity has arrived, it has not necessarily meant the adoption of reforms by the ruling parties of Eastern Europe. The introduction of a more flexible Soviet policy toward its Eastern European allies, one

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of the basic elements of the Gorbachev reforms, was greeted by veteran communists as both an end to the uncertainty of Soviet leadership and an opportunity for the Warsaw Pact nations to have greater leeway in the adoption of policies. The preferred policies, especially in the case of the GDR, ran counter to those of the CPSU as the East European leaderships spoke of their unique conditions. East Germany's leadership has long argued that the GDR's relatively strong economy has ruled out the necessity of economic reforms such as those advocated by Gorbachev for the USSR's struggling economy.

East Germany

The SED has long been associated with reforms, especially economic reforms, and is credited with a blending of technology with political orthodoxy at a time when most other East European regimes were rigidly locked into a Stalinist model. Yet, in recent years it has become evident that the GDR pursues reforms at its own pace and will not be subject to Soviet dictation or inspiration. GDR foreign policy still reflects a traditional approach and Politburo member Herman Axen's visit to the United States in 1988 was evidently motivated by a concern for the development of economic ties with the United States. The achievement of Most Favored Nation trade status with the U.S., a traditional and cautious objective, would enable East Germany to make significant progress in meeting its economic demands without instituting the sweeping reforms discussed elsewhere in East Europe. The most one will see in the GDR today is media discussions of changes in communist systems, changes that the SED is unlikely to consider for the GDR. For example, the chief of the Dresden party organization, Hans Modrow, wrote an article for a local newspaper in 1988 in which he praised the market reforms being implemented by the Chinese leadership. No recommendations for the GDR were drawn from the Chinese experience.[31] Acceptable *glasnost* in East Germany is confined to discussions of matters such as the

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availability of adequate consumer goods; sensitive topics with political implications are generally avoided by the official media.

The SED's position has won the GDR the distinction of being the most determined of the opponents of reforms in Eastern Europe. The starting point for the East German attitude is that their policies have been effective and require minimal adjustment to conform either to necessity or to Soviet guidance. Some of the SED's first critical comments dealt with the question of Soviet reforms in a somewhat indirect manner, targeting, not specific policies, but only the manifestations of those policies. Gorbachev's *glasnost*, as applied to the examination of Soviet history, brought especially scathing criticisms from an East German media that reacted against the production of a film – "Repentance" – that reviews the issue of Stalinism. Following the showing of "Repentance" on West German television, a medium that reaches over 80% of the GDR's households, *Neues Deutschland*, the SED daily, and *JungeWelt*, the youth organization daily, printed remarkably bitter reviews attacking the film as a "stone-age view mocking all those millions of people who risked their lives for mankind's progress" and a "mocking denunciation of revolutionary vigilance." According to the official press, a full and careful examination of history would note that, while Stalin did make "practical and theoretical" mistakes, the country was facing an enormous threat from "intervention, sabotage, opportunism, Trotskyism, and bourgeois nationalism." A class-conscious study of history would also give Stalin credit for the USSR's progress in achieving collectivization, industrialization, and the unanimity of the party in a time when "socialism was a daily decision between life and death...." The East German reviewers broadened their denunciation of this theatrical display of *glasnost* by warning that "Repentance" could be "misused" by West German anti-communists who simply wanted to associate the SED with what could be viewed as a "terrorist regime". While such an event may not have been the

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intention of the film's director, the East Germans concluded, there was no doubt that "Repentance" constituted new material for the "demagogic tricks" of the enemies of socialism.[32]

The State Press Office demonstrated the regime's opposition to *glasnost* in 1988 by intensifying its intervention in the work of weekly church publications. The June 19th edition of one paper, *Glaube und Heimat,* was denied permission for distribution because of its coverage of the Halle and Rostock church congresses, both of which were critical of the regime, and an article on the world environment day. Authorities defend their restrictive information policy with the observation that about thirty Western radio and television stations transmit broadcasts to the GDR each day. According to SED Central Committee Secretary Joachim Herrmann, "there is no other socialist country in which the opponent sits in the living room all day."[33]

A more explicit indication of the SED's views on *perestroika* and *glasnost* came with the West German publication in June, 1988 of an internal SED document that was distributed among middle-ranking party officials after Erich Honecker's talk with Bishop Werner Leich in March, 1988. In the document, which was at least in part an effort to provide party officials with arguments to be used in defense of party policy, Honecker insists that he agrees with Gorbachev's view that every country must act in accordance with its own conditions of national development. However, the GDR's ideological "consolidation" has given East Germany a set of requirements that are different from those of the USSR, so, according to Honecker, the GDR must solve its problems differently from other socialist countries. In specific terms this requires a rejection of basic features of the Soviet reform program. For example, many church organizations in the GDR are examining the Soviet reform course and concluding that the SED should accept the political implications of the Kremlin program by allowing changes in the nation's social policies, including what church leaders see as

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discrimination against Christians in the East German educational system. The SED internal document rejects church arguments on this point, insisting that discussions between the church and the Ministry of Public Education would be "irrelevant because equal treatment of children is guaranteed."[34]

The East German reluctance to support Gorbachev's reform efforts could be seen in Honecker's greetings to the CPSU Conference in June, 1988 when the SED leader limited himself to bland remarks about the strengthening of socialism. There was no reference at all to any of the reforms embodied in Gorbachev's program nor, for that matter, any reference to Gorbachev himself. Conference proceedings were carried live by East German radio and television and *Neues Deutschland* presented the full text of Gorbachev's speech. Yet, following Gorbachev's Conference address, the SED leadership made no comment on either the presentation or the conference and, again, declined to make any reference to *perestroika*, *glasnost*, or Gorbachev himself.[35]

At the same time, the SED Central Committee's sixth plenum indicated the weakness of reformist elements in SED. At the plenum, the leadership noted that East Germany was plagued by various economic problems such as shortages of good quality consumer goods but issued no demands for a restructuring of the nation's economic or political mechanisms. According to SED Central Committee Secretary Joachim Herrmann, East Germany does not need to alter its economic course because the Marxist-Leninist method has always been right as long as "it has not been applied dogmatically." What the GDR needs, he stressed, in order to overcome its economic difficulties is greater discipline and the introduction of microelectronics in all branches of the national economy. In commenting on the extensive reforms that some of its allies had adopted, Herrmann noted that the GDR is "waiting for the results" of those efforts before considering their relevance to their needs.[36]

The SED's critical posture regarding reforms was

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elaborated still further at the fall session of the Central Committee when General Secretary Honecker rejected suggestions of "influential people from the Western world" who want the GDR to deviate from its proven path. First Secretary of the Berlin *bezirk* leadership, Gunter Schabowski, echoed Honecker's skepticism by rejecting *glasnost* in the study of recent history when he denounced "ignorant or hysterical authors" who "condemn and dismantle chapter two of world history, which we have helped to write." Schabowski also charged that it is the GDR's enemies in the FRG who "are currently twisting their tongues over terms such as "*perestroika*" and "*glasnost*" in order to prescribe us private lessons in the cause of socialism." While affirming as "sacred" the East German "militant alliance" with the USSR, Gerhard Muller, pointed out that the international reputation of the GDR and its political and economic successes were the result of the SED's "prudent policy, which is based on Marxism-Leninism", the "specific conditions of the GDR", and a recognition of the fact that "at present the class struggle is escalating in an ideological sense", an obvious reference to Gorbachev's speculation about a reduction of the role of the CPSU and the increasing Soviet emphasis on "humanitarian" issues in contrast to "class" issues. In his speech to the plenum, the Director of the Central Committee Academy for Social Sciences, Otto Reinhold, was even more explicit as he decried the "so-called reform proposals" under which the party "is to be reduced to a debating club."[37]

East German resistance to reforms assumed an especially blatant form when, in an historic first in November, 1988, the party daily announced that the increasingly popular Soviet monthly press digest *Sputnik* as well as five Soviet films dealing with controversial historical questions had been withdrawn from circulation in the GDR. While in the recent past, specific issues of Soviet periodicals had been banned from the GDR because their treatment of *glasnost*-related issues ran counter to the SED's positions, never before had a Soviet publication been subject to a general prohibition of

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this type. Following the regime's ban of the Soviet publication, there were protests in numerous East German cities and withdrawals from the SED by party members objecting to the leadership's denunciation of Sputnik. According to *Umweltblatterr*, a magazine published by an East German church organization, workers at the Leuna Works near Halle went on strike for several hours and there were other protests in East Berlin, Leipzig, Jena, Halle, and Weimar.[38]

The criticisms of the East German leadership have focused on both economic and political reforms that have been advanced by its WTO allies. A general observation in *Neues Deutschland* summarized the SED position by insisting that the party should always play the leading role in society, that industry should be operated by the state rather than by private enterprises whether East German or Western, and that the economic foundations of the regime should be based not on capitalistic laws of supply and demand but upon an arrangement of subsidized prices. Unemployment, a basic element of many Eastern European economic reforms, does not, in the SED's view, represent a rational alternative to the problem of inefficient industry but is a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to work.[39]

Czechoslovakia

After the GDR, the most implacable foe of political reforms is Czechoslovakia. The elevation of Milos Jakes as General Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in December, 1987 marked the beginning of a new period of anti-reformism in Czechoslovakia. While the regime has given verbal support to political and economic reforms, it has been critical of many of the practices associated with those reforms. In reporting on the activities of Soviet reformists, for example, the party press has often denounced the "chasm-like gap between their political slogans and their political practice" and charged reformers with manipulating public opinion into supporting "extremist ideas." Czechoslovakia's own policies have been consistently traditional and have

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embraced none of the fundamental changes undertaken in Hungary and Poland. The leadership has also been emphatic in rejecting suggestions of a necessary linkage between political and economic reforms, a proposition that has underscored the efforts of East Europe's leading reformist parties.[40]

Like other East European states, Czechoslovakia is experimenting with economic reforms, if only on a limited basis that does not involve basic structural modifications. The limited scope of economic innovations is illustrated by new legislation on joint ventures, one of the region's latest efforts to encourage Western investment. The Czechoslovakian law on joint ventures, however, places severe restrictions on the Western firms and gives the government the right to override decisions of the joint venture and, in many cases, to completely close down joint operations. Requirements for the joint ventures to maintain "social funds" to benefit the regime and to go through the Czechoslovak State Bank for hard currency credits also diminish the attractiveness of the program for Western businesses. In spite of the economic adversities facing the country, the government continues to eschew Western loans. And, even though their main customers, the Soviets, are becoming reluctant to accept the increasingly low quality machinery produced by Skoda and other Czechoslovakian firms, the party has postponed an industrial modernization program. Growing shortages of food and consumer goods have been an insufficient stimulus to a regime that is determined to resist substantial economic reforms. In fact, the leadership is even offering some features of its faltering economic system as an alternative to Gorbachev's reforms for the Soviet Union. When CPSU Politburo member Egor Ligachev, a leading opponent of Gorbachev's reform efforts and the USSR's top official for agricultural issues, visited Czechoslovakia in March, 1989, he suggested that the "Czechoslovakian agricultural experience could help the USSR resolve its food shortage problems."[41]

One of the most distinctive features of Czechoslovakia's

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anti-reformist course has been the renewed effort to suppress dissent. Brutality, large-scale arrests, and overtly Stalinist measures are being used to discourage public expressions of disagreement with official policy. Following a series of unauthorized demonstrations in Prague on Friday, October 28, 1988, the party daily declared that "foreign organizers" were responsible and accused the British Foreign Office of have "formulated" the "objectives pursued by Friday's antistate demonstration."[42] In 1988, Czech Catholic activist Augustin Navratil was placed in a psychiatric clinic in Kromeriz following an order from the Brno District Court. Navratil had circulated a petition demanding religious freedom and had gotten over 500,000 signatures indicating support for his demand.[43] Pressures against dissidents have taken the form of what some observers characterize as a "manhunt" in which regime critics are "publicly criticized in their enterprise, at their school or workplace and have to fear repression." Employers are informed if workers are involved in demonstrations and asked to "deal with this matter publicly."[44] In commenting on the resurgence of dissent, authorities compare these events to those of 1968 when "right-wing" forces sought to disrupt the image and security of Czechoslovakia. Party leaders now charge that the "protagonists of the Prague Spring have not learned their lesson" and are "organizing subversive campaigns against our republic from their cushy jobs at universities, in incendiary radio stations, and in other institutions of psychological warfare."[45]

A key element of the process of change in Eastern Europe has been the willingness to reconsider the roles of prominent historical figures and to evaluate the impact of that new analysis on the current regime's status. The official Czech attitude toward such an examination of history was demonstrated in December, 1988 when a new statue of Felix Dzerzhinskiy, the founder of the Soviet political police, was unveiled in Prague. In response to a reader who had written questioning if the time had arrived for a reassessment of the. Work of Dzershinskiy, the party daily *Rude Pravo* responded

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that "there is no reason to change our attitude.... Dzershinskiy's activity was the implementation of his personal slogan – cool brain, ardent heart, and absolutely clean hands." According to Jiri Kohout, who wrote the paper's response to the reader, it is only "bourgeois journalists and historians" who want to rethink Soviet history. In Kohout's view, the reader wants to see everything in "black" and "does not wait for the facts, he invents them in advance!" Kohout concludes by suggesting that not only is this mere cynicism it is, perhaps, simply an "intention to inflict harm by slander", something that can only be the work of "agitators and slanderers".[46]

As with Bulgaria, the Soviet Union has expressed reservations about the course of events in Czechoslovakia and, evidently, endeavored to make at least a limited move against the party's hardliners in 1988. The most conspicuous symbol of the Stalinist-Brezhnevite mentality among the Czech leadership was Vasil Bilak, an especially unpopular and prominent anti-reformist figure. In his memoirs Bilak proudly recounts how he worked to undermine pro-reformist regional secretaries in preparing for the Soviet invasion in 1968 and Dubcek's removal in April, 1969. Shortly after the dismissal of one of the country's principal reform advocates, Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal, Bilak journeyed to East Germany where he appeared to be in the process of helping consolidate East European resistance to Gorbachev's policies. Evidently, Bilak's remarks in the GDR angered Gorbachev and prompted him to call for Bilak's removal from his leadership positions. The Kremlin's pressure and Bilak's negative image among Czech citizens and leadership circles were obviously more than Jakes could resist so Bilak was ousted.[47]

While Bilak's departure may improve the position of Czechoslovakia's advocates of change, the political balance leans heavily toward a continuation of traditional Stalinist policy. The high praise that Ligachev offered for Czech agriculture may well indicate that elements of the leadership

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are being utilized in the Kremlin's power struggle, a situation that would considerably raise the stakes in Prague's political game. Recent political maneuvers have increased the prospects for a continuation of Jakes policies after his announced retirement following the party Congress in 1990. According to decisions of the Central Committee at its meeting in the fall of 1988, political power will rest in the hands of Miroslav Stepan, a hardliner who directed the repression of recent Prague demonstrations and has replaced Vasil Bilak on the Politburo in 1988, and Jiri Baryl, an associate of Stepan's and a close friend of Jakes' eldest son who has a background in the political police. These careful political steps have been augmented by the imposition of an indirect state of emergency which was proclaimed on February 14, 1989. Under accompanying legislation, legal penalties for dissident activities are strengthened and police authority to move against dissidents is much broader. Barring a dramatic change in the political balance, Czechoslovakia is likely to continue to be on of Eastern Europe's most implacable foes of *perestroika*.[48]

Romania

The intensity of the Romanian Communist Party's (RCP) opposition to Soviet-style reforms has consolidated the regime's image as a maverick while also accelerating the country's economic decline. The RCP position under Nicolae Ceausescu is anchored on a rejection of privatization of the economy, a preservation of the party's leading role on all political and social issues, and a determination to suppress all forms of dissident activities. This policy is motivated not so much by a dogmatic reading of Marxism-Leninism as by the dictates of a distinctive personality cult that surrounds the figures of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. The popular demands and the economic requirements for restructuring seen elsewhere in Eastern Europe exist in Romania as well but are resisted by the strength of Ceausescu's small personal following that dominates the RCP and the Securitate,

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Romania's political police. Ceausescu persists in describing his socialism as "marvelous" maintains there is no need to discuss its improvement beyond the "firm implementation of science and new technology and developing the revolutionary spirit."[49]

In spite of the fact that Romania is plagued by severe shortages and now boasts a standard of living on the level of Albania's, Ceausescu insists there is no need for a significant alteration of the RCP's economic policies. By the fall of 1988, energy and fuel restrictions had become so severe that mere survival had become a challenge. In Romanian towns the electricity ration is only sufficient to allow a person to boil a kettle twice a day and the daily ration of food is so small that shoppers will fight over potatoes on the rare occasions when they are available in stores. As the winter of 1988-89 approached, Romanian citizens looked forward to a diet of only rice, sugar, margarine and frozen chicken feet. When the effort to meet minimal nutritional levels became an almost impossible tasks, Ceausescu declared that the shortages were not the result of an economic failure but simply a recognition of the fact that Romanians were over-weight and needed to go on an enforced diet. Meanwhile, the regime continues to embrace an economic plan that calls for the export of most of its agricultural products in order to reduce the nation's foreign debt. There is no consideration of measures to increase the role of private entrepreneurs and new economic measures generally involve efforts to further reduce Romania's few vestiges of private property. The best known of these undertakings is a massive plan for rural resettlement which will eventually force the relocation of peasants in 550 "agroindustrial centers" which will replace small rural villages and eliminate the ability of farmers to produce the consumer agricultural products that enable Romanians to eat in spite of bare grocery shelves.[50]

As workers and students resort to protest demonstrations and disaffected party officials voice their opposition to Ceausescu's policies, authorities are responding with denun-

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ciations of "treasonous plots" and foreign intervention in Romanian affairs. When six senior RCP members offered public criticisms of regime policies in 1989, the official press printed a declaration that the Securitate had "uncovered a grave action of betrayal" of state interests which had been directed by Mircea Raceanu, a former Romanian diplomat. The arrest and indictment of Raceanu marked the first step in a campaign to formally label all dissent as treason and all demands for reform as an effort to undermine socialism. Demonstrations by workers and students are countered with violent police actions and increased police surveillance in towns such as Brasov, Cluj, and Iasi, centers of popular unrest against the regime. The alienation of Romanians from their own government is also reflected in the interest that many citizens have developed in Soviet and Bulgarian television. With Romanian television limited to two hours per day and most of that devoted to coverage of Ceausescu, thousands of Romanians now eagerly follow the relatively outspoken Soviet broadcasts and the more interesting Bulgarian television programs.[51]

As other WTO states engage in speculation about a reduction of the dominant role of the party, the RCP rejects political reforms that would reduce the party's authority. On the contrary, the Romanian leadership maintains that any improvements in the socialist system would entail not a reduction but rather an expansion of the role of the party. In Ceausescu's view, which was outlined in an editorial in the RCP daily in January, 1989, it is the efforts to "increase the party's leading role" which enjoy a "priceless theoretical and practical political significance" in contemporary Romania. This situation exists, we are told, because the "party enjoys profound esteem and boundless trust and is unanimously followed by the people" and requires all "revolutionary communists...to firmly act against any liquidatorist trend of weakening the party role...."[52]

Claims of unanimous support for the RCP obviously lack substance as conditions in the country continue to deteriorate

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and popular discontent is expressed in a variety of ways. Many show their dissatisfaction by attempting to flee across one of Romania's treacherous frontiers. According to a report by the International Human Rights Association, in 1988 the Romanian-Yugoslav frontier became the bloodiest in Europe as at least 400 people were killed while trying to flee from Romania into Yugoslavia. In addition to the four hundred who were shot, an unknown number of refugees are believed to have drowned in their attempts to swim across the river that divides the two nations. Others have been seriously injured in escape attempts when attacked by the bloodhounds that are used by border patrols. Those caught while attempting to escape face a minimum of two years in labor camps. Many Romanian citizens, however, make good on their escape plans and there are now over 17,000 Romanian refugees in Hungary. The USSR has become the destination of many refugees who believe that life in Soviet Moldavia is preferable to that in Romania.[53]

As the only East European leader to make absolutely no concessions to demands for reforms, Ceausescu has been the target of indirect criticism by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. During Ceausescu's official visit to Moscow in 1988, Gorbachev used a state luncheon as a forum for expressing concern about Romania's economic mismanagement and abuse of human rights. Furthermore, upon his arrival, Ceausescu was not, as is the custom, greeted by Gorbachev at the airport, a clear, public indication of Soviet displeasure with RCP policies. Yet, even with Soviet pressure, the prospects for imminent change are not bright. Ceausescu is more intransigent than ever on the issue of reforms and equally determined to share power with no one outside his close circle. A series of high level purges in 1989 and a renewed effort by Elena Ceausescu to assume more formal authority, perhaps by becoming Prime Minister, indicate not only the existence of dissatisfaction among the leadership but, more importantly, Ceausescu's refusal to tolerate the most minor of disagreements. For many Romanians, even those

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who in the past were intensely anti-Soviet, the Soviet Union now represents the best hope for the salvation of a Romania firmly in the grip of an abusive Ceausescu entourage. Student demonstrators in Iasi voiced what many Romanians feel when the chanted "Long live Moldavia", a reference to both the Soviet province seen by many as Romanian territory and the increasingly common belief that Romanians would be better off if they were Soviet citizens.[54]

Reasons for East Europe's Resistance

Why do so many of East Europe's leaders resist Gorbachev's reform policies? For most of East Europe, domestic pressure for change has been generated by developments in the Soviet Union. The East German case is especially telling. Rising expectations about major revisions in the GDR's policies have given the SED another crisis to, which to respond at a time when a sluggish economy and the continued appeal of the Federal Republic constitute more than enough of a challenge. A second reason for the critical posture of many East European leaders is the change in Gorbachev's approach to reform since he came to power in 1985. Initially, Soviet reforms were seen as an endorsement of East European reforms such as those of the GDR under Honecker. Fulsome Soviet praise of past East German reforms was undoubtedly reassuring to the SED. However, as Gorbachev found himself blocked by the inertia of the Soviet bureaucratic system, he was forced to radicalize his programs in 1987 and, in the process, alienated not only significant portions of the Kremlin hierarchy but also the East German leadership which now felt pressure to defend its "reformed" system against demands for even more reforms. A final reason for the adoption of this position is the continuing insecurity of many East European regimes. None suffers from this more than the GDR. Long described as a "front line state" facing the Western threat on a daily basis, the GDR retains much of that "front line mentality" even after the emergence of a more relaxed international environment. The

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East German leadership, as well as that of Czechoslovakia which must contend with memories of 1968, evidently feels that it has less margin for error in experimenting with reforms and in engaging in the self-criticism associated with Soviet-style *glasnost*. The criticisms in the party press of the Soviet film "Repentance" highlighted this insecurity with charges that the re-examination of Soviet history was being used by the GDR's enemies in the FRG to damage the image of the SED.

Other regimes identified with East Europe's conservative retrenchment are responding to equally compelling though less complex factors. Romanian opposition to *perestroika* appears to be little more than a function of Ceausescu's personality cult while Bulgarian resistance is evidently motivated by a fear of the consequences of genuine change in a system that has been tightly controlled for many decades. The appearance of a domestic opposition obviously stimulated Zhivkov's repressive moves in 1988 and 1989. Another factor which must be taken into account is the belief, often expressed among Western specialists on Soviet and East European politics, that Gorbachev's political future is insecure and that he may be destroyed by the forces which he has unleashed in the USSR. Like politicians anywhere, those in Eastern Europe do not wish to be closely identified with policies that might be suddenly repudiated by the nation which advanced them. What are the future prospects of Eastern Europe's opponents to *perestroika*? Erich Honecker, at 76, is in poor health and is suffering from the consequences of his imprisonment by the Nazis. Most recently, he appears to be suffering from a loss of his voice, a handicap that was first noticed in public in September, 1988 when he paused for several minutes during his address to the SED workers militia. Most of the report that he presented to the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee on December 1, 1988, was read for him by other party officials. His political departure would be a major blow to the forces of resistance. Ceausescu and Zhivkov are also plagued by

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advanced years and declining health. A change of leaders in either of these nations would be a boost to reform prospects since each has surrounded himself by a tight, isolated group that is trying to hold back reformist tides in the Balkans. Only in Czechoslovakia, where Jakes has secured approval of succession arrangements, is a conservative regime secure against the uncertainties of leadership changes.[55]

Yet, if the political future of the Bloc's leading hardliners are limited, qualifications are also required in evaluating the prospects of the region's most prominent advocate of reform. Almost universally regarded as East Europe's leading reformist regime, Hungary is locked in a struggle between factions split over the proper extent of the party's reform program. HSWP General-Secretary Karoly Grosz, himself an advocate of reforms, is challenged by Politburo member Imre Pozsgay, an advocate of even more extensive reforms who has described the 1956 Hungarian revolt as a "popular uprising" rather than the "counterrevolutionary" act which most party leaders still denounce.[56] Such divisions within reformist ranks, at best, weaken the reformist course and, at worst, might provoke the disorder that could be used by the party's still powerful anti-reform faction.

The Crisis in Soviet-East European Relations

Gorbachev's dilemma in Eastern Europe is the result of a situation in which the pursuit of genuine reforms by the USSR's allies could well lead to the region's estrangement from the Soviet Union, thus requiring a repetition of actions such as the Kremlin took in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Even the relatively direct economic reform impulses in Eastern Europe have a divisive impact. The required tools for economic reforms — technology and foreign capital, to cite two of the most obvious — can only be found outside the CMEA system. The acquisition of those necessities will draw the nations of Eastern Europe away from their political community and thus undermine the foundations of the system. Yet, a refusal to embark on a reformist path could

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well lead to an economic collapse in Eastern Europe that would require the Soviet Union to intervene – perhaps with its limited financial resources – in order prevent the complete disintegration of. Marxist-Leninist power in East Europe.

As Gorbachev has conceded that the Soviet model is plagued by consistent failure, the East European regimes have felt free to set individual agendas and make demands that are a reflection of their particular situations. According to Jiri Hajek, the former Czechoslovak foreign minister who became a Charter 77 activist, there has been an increase in civic courage in Eastern Europe as people are no longer so fearful of the consequences of dissent. Yet, the sense of urgency that motivates demands for change in the USSR drives East Europeans in a different, more Western oriented direction. The East European historical consciousness has been shaped by stronger ties with Western civilization and, consequently, the East European vision of reform is traditionally much more radical and much less Marxist-Leninist than that of the Soviet Union's reformers.[57] In this era of reforms, it is becoming obvious that Marxism-Leninism, a battered belief system that enjoys far more prestige in the capitalist West than in Eastern Europe, has once again failed. This most recent failure, one which is of great importance in maintaining the Soviet-East European alliance, is its inability to serve as a unifying force that can hold the region together as part of a distinct international system. As the debate over reforms continues to pull these regimes in different directions, the prospects for maintaining an alliance that is no longer sustained by a strong ideological framework grow weaker.

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POLITICAL ÉLITES AND PARTY ORGANIZATION IN GREECE: AN ENTREPRENEURIAL MODEL

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Northern Illinois University

The influence of élite dominant groups in shaping national and international developments has been of sustaining interest to political scientists and political sociologists alike. By élite dominant groups is meant all those who by profession and institutional affiliation occupy structural positions. These positions are strategically located in the social and political structures. Because of their strategic location, élite groups directly or indirectly influence policies and decisions that have far reaching consequences for political and social change. This is clearly the position in Greece, where the ruling PASOK party and the major opposition party, New Democracy, are organized around charismatic political leaders, whereas the KKE or Communist Party, operates on a strict basis of Marxist organizational principles.

The literature on the conceptual and empirical analyses of élites in the United States has been quite extensive and includes the writings of Lasswell (1961, 1965), C.W. Mills (1956), Hunter (1953, 1959), Dahl (1961), Presthus (1964), Keller (1963), Domhoff (1971, 1978a and 1978b), Dye (1983), and Baltzell (1964). The literature on political élites and political development in other countries is also extensive. To

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mention only a few comparative works one has to include Robins (1976); Czudnowski ed. (1983a and b); Prewitt (1970); Putnam (1976); Useem(1984).

One can distinguish two major theoretical and empirical streams of thought in the study and analyses of élites in general and political élites in particular: the aristocratic or conservative and the radical views. The former draws from the writings of classical élite theorists and their contemporaries while the latter view is represented by radical structuralists such as Mills, Hunter, and Domhoff. The aristocratic theory of élites is predicated on two assumptions which are interrelated. The first is the belief in the natural superiority of the élites and the second in the necessity of élites for any directed political and social change in society. This latter view sees the masses as distrustful and inconsistent in initiating any substantive changes and/or incapable of ruling themselves.

In contrast to the conservatives, the radical analysts are rather critical of élites. They point out the inherent undemocratic and oligarchic tendencies of élites. They do not believe in élite inevitability nor do they perceive the masses as inconsistent or distrustful. Both radical and conservative élite analysts view the élites as a cohesive group. C. W. Mills (1956), for example, described American society as ruled by a "power élite" – a tripartite power group of corporate executives, top government officials, and high ranking military chiefs. Unlike Mills and Hunter who stressed structural aspects, Domhoff emphasized the social nature of the governing class which he equates with the capitalist ruling class. The study of élite integration and recruitment is central to the understanding and behavior of élites and leaders alike. Michels (1959) argued that there is a social-psychological transformation of political élites and leaders when they occupy positions and roles of authority. It was his contention that there is a tendency among élites and leaders of organizations/institutions, including political ones, toward what he called the "iron law of oligarchy." Political

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élite integration has a bearing on social and political change. Likewise, recruitment can be both an important dimension of élite integration. Who is recruited to fill incumbent élite positions is important in fostering unity or disunity among the élites.

While the literature on élite recruitment is substantial this is not the case with respect of élite integration. Most élite integration studies deal with societal integration in general, especially among developing and emerging nations and societies. The study of élite integration and recruitment in society and polity will be an exercise in futility if it were not for the consequences that both phenomena have on such specific and important issues as stability and democracy, oligarchy, system's effectiveness, political conflict, extremism, and social and/or political change in general. Numerous scholars, for example, have advanced hypotheses concerning the consequences of élite integration and recruitment. To mention only a few, one has to include Lipset (1981), Field and Higley (1973), Putman (1976), Michels (1959), C. W. Mills (1956).

The argument of élite integration as fostering political stability and effectiveness is very persuasive. Élite integration especially among developing and emerging nations is exceedingly difficult to achieve due to fragmentation and the onset of socioeconomic modernization in these societies. In the 1950s and 1960s, many believed that military élite integration through a proliferation of military coups and counter coups would lead to élite cohesiveness and therefore directed political and social change from above. These beliefs, however, had no empirical support. Neither civilian political party rule nor military rule can guarantee élite unity. Even if it does, military élite unity or one party rule may foster oligarchic and undemocratic tendencies. One can find many examples of prætorian and oligarchical rule in most of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

For some, élite integration fosters political stability and effectiveness, for others it leads to oligarchic tendencies. Élite

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integration may be undesirable in a democracy. Élite integration and stability might be good for business and multinationals but not necessarily for human rights and individual freedom. Élite unity can be achieved basically in two ways — through conformity (élitism, oligarchy) — or through diversity (pluralism, democracy, interdependence).

In terms of recruitment there is a similar argument. For some élite recruitment is heavily drawn from the upper levels of society and therefore unrepresentative of society at large. For others élite recruitment does not have to be representative as long as élites are genuinely interested in the aspirations and the legitimate demands and rights of people. Both of these views are supported by different groups and individuals with varying oligarchical or democratic tendencies.

A number of students of Greek politics and society (Legg, 1969; Pollis, 1965; Kourvetaris, 1971a and b, 1977; Kourvetaris/Dobratz, 1984a and b) have suggested that Greece's problem as an unstable democracy lies not so much in the nature of its people but in the process of recruitment and personality of its leaders. In other words, it is more of a problem concerning the top rather than a problem at the bottom of the social and political structure. The dominant groups have been one of the major problems of Greece since inception as an independent nation in the mid-19th century. The modern political and social history of Greece is replete with frequent military interventions, coups, counter-coups, revolts, civil wars, and political crises, in general.

Recently, there has been an effort to empirically study social and political leaders in Greek society. Alexander (1964) studied the Greek industrial élites, Kourvetaris (1971a and b) the military, Kourvetaris/Dobratz (1984a and b) Greek politics and class élites, Legg (1969) the Greek political parties, and Meynaud (1966) political forces in Greece.[1] The frequent military interventions and the breakdown of democratic regimes in the past have contributed to the negative perceptions of the people toward the effectiveness of their political leaders. Such negative public perceptions may

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weaken the effectiveness of the political system.

In the overall world, the Greek capitalist system finds itself in the semi-periphery. While Greece has made relatively great economic progress in the last 30-40 years, its political institutions, bureaucratic, and political leadership have not developed as rapidly. Greece has experienced political instability, frequent military interventions, and prætorian rule. While the literature on national and/or cross national studies of political, and other social élites and leaders, in general, is substantial, in the case of Greece we find very little on leaders and élites in general and political élites in particular.

The emphasis in this paper will be on the integration of élites in the major Greek political parties. *Élite integration* will be defined as cohesiveness and unity of those who occupy different levels of political positions.

A Profile of Political Forces in Greece

On October 18, 1981, and again on June 2, 1985, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), under the charismatic leadership of Andreas Papandreou, an American educated former professor of economics, won landslide victories with 48.06% and 46.51% of the popular vote and the majority of the 300 member parliament (*Voule*) or 172 and 162 deputies respectively. The PASOK victories gave Greece two socialist governments in the last eight years. Andreas Papandreou became prime minister and minister of defense in the first socialist government. PASOK's platform was clearly opposed to that of the New Democracy, which had been in power since the restoration of democracy in 1974. In his campaign Andreas Papandreou promised "allaghe" meaning change. Most people perceived PASOK as the party of change while the ruling party of the New Democracy was perceived as the party of the establishment and the privileged classes. In most domestic and foreign policy issues, PASOK was the antithesis of the New Democracy. While the New Democracy had a basic pro-Western platform (pro-

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NATO, pro-EEC, and pro-U.S. bases in Greece), PASOK ran on a pro-Greek independence stand rather than adherence to any superpower. A number of polls indicated that the major issue that worried people was inflation. (Greece has one of the highest rates of inflation in Europe running currently about 18%-20%.) PASOK capitalized on anti-Western, anti-American feelings among the young, idealistic, and liberal-oriented Greek voters especially in the 1981 electoral campaign.

Since 1974 Greece has experienced a series of dramatic sociopolitical and economic changes, both on the national and international levels, which have had far reaching consequences for Greek society and politics. We can only list some of the most dramatic changes here: The disengagement of the military from politics and the restoration of civilian government in 1974; the adoption of a new constitution and a change from a crowned constitutional democracy to a republic; the legalization of the Greek Communist Party (KKE); the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO in 1974 (due to NATO's tacit support of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus) and the more recent reentry of Greece into the military wing of NATO in 1980; the official accession of Greece to the EEC on January 1, 1981; the election of the first socialist government in Greece on October 18, 1981; and its re-election on June 2, 1985.

Greece has a multi-party system. Despite the proliferation of a smaller number of political parties and political groupings and/or political formations in Greece, there are three major political parties and/or political formations in Greece. The governing Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) is a left of the center political movement rather than a political party. The opposition, the New Democracy, is the second largest party – the old political right – which has tried to change and adopt a more middle of the road political image. The old center party disappeared in the 1981 national elections. Its more liberal faction joined PASOK and its more conservative faction joined the New Democracy. The

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third largest party of Greece is the Communist Party (KKE) which was split into two factions, those who follow the Moscow Communist Party line (Exterior) and the Eurocommunists (Interior). The pro-Moscow faction is the strongest of the two and elects about a dozen deputies or receives 10%-12% of the popular vote in national elections. The Eurocommunists or the Interior is a small party which does not receive more than 2% of the popular vote or elect more than one deputy. Recently the Eurocommunists renamed their party the Party of the Left. Their leader is Leonidas Kyrkos, a former deputy who served in both the Greek and European Parliaments at different times.

The New Democracy Party is the progeny of the Greek Radical Union Party, founded and dominated by one man, Constantine Caramanlis, the Cincinnatus of Modern Greece, who dominated Greek politics for a half century. Likewise, PASOK is a product of Andreas Papandreou, an economics professor and a son of the late George Papandreou, prime minister of Greece. Political élites are not unlike other social élites in Greece. In general, social élites, and political élites in particular, are competitive, antagonistic, personalistic, and factional. The political game is survival in a highly competitive and antagonistic social structure in which political rewards and political power are as scarce as anything else in society in which clientelism, in-group cronyism, kinship and family solidarity are institutionalized. In Greece, all political parties, with the exception of the KKE, tend to be personality bound. Parties and political movements are virtually inseparable from their leaders. People more readily identify with the leader of the party or movement than the party platform.

The *Voule*, the Greek parliament, is the main legislative branch of government and the party that controls the majority of deputies is the governing party. Greece is a parliamentary presidential democracy. It has a prime minister and a president of the republic. The prime minister is the leader of the majority party and serves for four years. The

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president is elected by the 2/3 majority of the *Voule*. All Greek citizens who are 18 years of age or older are eligible to vote. To be elected as a deputy candidates must be 25 years of age. Certain civil servants, military officers, civil servants of municipalities, and state employees cannot run for office unless they resign their appointments.

In his study of social composition and political cartography of *Voule*, Metaxas (1981) has found that in the national elections of 1964, 1974, and 1977, 60% of the deputies were lawyers and doctors (50% mostly lawyers). Metaxas gives three major reasons why lawyers are over- represented in the Greek *Voule*. These are: professional, class, and the bureaucratic function of the state. By profession, lawyers are better equipped and socialized to succeed as politicians. They develop a political consciousness. They deal with personal freedom. The majority of the lawyers are progressive. Metaxas also found that in 1964 91.91%, in 1974 96.75%, and in 1977 99.41% were university graduates. Compared with all the parties, the center-right political forces were better educated. Those who studied overseas and the more traditional political forces were found to be better educated. PASOK came second. In terms of Ph.D.s, the traditional political forces came first, the center second, and PASOK third. From the analysis of biographical material of parliamentarians, Perdikaris (1981) found that the nature of social and economic transformation in Greece, to a large extent, was related to the nature of social composition of its political leadership. The sociological composition of the parliament represents an expression of the relatedness between the social class and systems of dominant values.

Data Collection and Research Procedures

The data were collected during my sabbatical in the spring of 1984. In the summers of 1982 and 1983, I visited Greece and familiarized myself with the new political forces developing in Greece. My interest in Greek politics in general and political élites in particular spans my entire

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academic career. During my frequent visits to Greece I kept abreast and became acquainted with the new socialist political élites by conducting a pilot study in the summer of 1983 to be followed up with a study of political recruitment and integration of political élites later. I mailed a 4-page questionnaire to all 300 Greek deputies in the summer of 1983. A variety of demographic and issue oriented Likert type questions on domestic and foreign affairs were included in the pilot study. The rate of return, however, was very small (10-15%) and I did not follow up because, in the meantime, I had to return to the U.S.A.

On the basis of the pilot study and extensive reading, I finalized the interview schedule which I used in the spring 1984. Originally, I planned to interview 1/4 of the 300 deputies of the 1981 parliament (*Voule*) from the two major political parties of PASOK (The Panhellenic Socialist Party n=166) and ND (New Democracy n=113), and all the independents (n=9) and communists (n=12) represented in the 1981 *Voule*. Despite my Herculean efforts to contact deputies from all political parties, I was unable to arrange or was refused interviews with most PASOK and communist deputies, with the exception of two PASOK women deputies and one member of the KKE (Interior), who subsequently became the leader of the EAR or the Party of the Left (formerly the Eurocommunist Interior Party). The reasons for refusal were simply that they were instructed by the central committee or the leadership of their party not to give any interviews. My subsequent efforts to contact deputies of PASOK were also unsuccessful, and consequently most of my interviews were conducted with deputies of the New Democracy, the opposition party in the Greek *Voule*. Thus PASOK was presented to me through the eyes of the opposition and my own perceptions of the political forces at work.

All in all, I managed to complete 37 interviews of one to two hours duration each. The interview schedule included questions on their political career and beliefs of politicians,

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their view on domestic and foreign issues, political trust, perceptions of political leadership, government policies, democracy, oligarchy, the dominant groups/institutions/élites in Greek society and a number of socio-demographic questions. Of the 37 respondents 30 were deputies of ND, 4 independents, 2 PASOK, and 1 Eurocommunist. Of the four independent deputies three were formerly PASOK members who became independent in protest of PASOK's policies. During the June 2, 1985, national elections, two of the three independents were elected deputies under the New Democracy Party. All three who quit PASOK were directly or indirectly connected with the armed forces as former officers (one a retired general, another a first lieutenant, and the third a former deputy minister of defense in the PASOK government). All three were leaning toward the center or New Democracy. The fourth independent was the grandson of a former prime minister of Greece. This deputy had been elected to the *Voule* fourteen times – and was by far the oldest and the most experienced politician, who had served many times as minister in previous governments and was founder of a national party – a conservative and an extremely educated person. He spoke English and other foreign languages fluently.

An Entrepreneurial Model of Élite Recruitment and Integration: Discussion and Analysis

In this analysis interviews were held with deputies elected in the 1981 national elections which, like those of 1985, resulted in a victory for PASOK, the Greek socialists. Of 300 deputies in *the Voule*, 288 were elected and 12 were chosen from the political parties as outstanding individuals – known as *Vouleftes* of *epikrateias* (a sort of superdelegate or honorary deputy). Of the 300 *Vouleftes* represented in the *Voule* as of Nov. 5, 1984, there were 166 PASOK, 113 ND, 12 KKE, and 9 independents.

As a group, the *Vouleftes* are professional, educated, by and large all male, and upper middle to upper class Greeks.

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Almost half of them (138 or 41.4%) were lawyers, 27 or 8.1% were engineers, 17 or 5.1%, were military officers, 14.5% teachers, 19 or 5.7% university professors, 11 or 3.3% economists. The rest represent an assortment of businessmen, civil servants, sociologists, bankers, accountants, actors, journalists, farmers, industrialists, and clerical or blue collar workers.

In terms of frequency of deputies elected to *Voule*, it was found that the majority of PASOK deputies were elected for the first term. This was to be expected because it was a new political party. With an exception of two dozen or so deputies and ministers, the majority of deputies and ministers of the governing party were new. This was less true of the opposition and communist parties. In the 1985 *Voule*, PASOK had 161 deputies out of 300. In addition, there was a new president of the Greek Republic who replaced Constantine Caramanlis when the latter resigned after PASOK decided not to support his re-election.

On the far right was EPEN, the National Political Union. Its leader is George Papadopoulos, the coup-maker and dictator who ruled Greece during 1967-1974, but was subsequently imprisoned when his government was overthrown. EPEN participated in the Euroelections of June 17, 1984, but received only 2.29 percent of the vote, electing one representative for the European parliament. However, in the June 5, 1985 national elections it failed to receive enough votes to elect any deputy to the *Voule*.

With the exception of the Communist Party (KKE), both Exterior (Soviet-aligned) and the Party of the Left or the former Interior (Eurocommunist), all other political parties in Greece are organized around their leader. Charismatic political leadership plays an exceedingly important role in Greek politics which essentially represents a three party system with PASOK and New Democracy as the dominant political parties and the KKE holding a smaller position. All other minor political parties currently play a rather insignificant role in Greek electoral politics.

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Recruitment and Integration of Political Élites

There is an entrepreneurial model for the recruitment and integration of the Greek political élites operating through what might be called "push" and "pull" factors. The processes of recruitment and integration are quite different for each of the three parties represented in the 1981 *Voule*. Although over 100 political parties were legally registered, only a dozen or so took part in the national elections of 1981. In Greece there are as many political parties as there are political entrepreneurs, and the saying is that if two Greeks disagree they start two different political parties. There is some truth to this hyperbole. For purposes of conceptual clarity each of the three political parties will be discussed as entrepreneurial models. The term entrepreneurial is used here to mean, broadly, the innovative, business-like political leader and his party or movement who tries to attract votes in an ideologically charged marketplace of political sloganeers and political marketeers. The voters are seen as politicized consumers who shop for political ideas and products offered by the political entrepreneurs.

PASOK began as more of a political movement than a political party. It started outside Greece, mainly in Western Europe and Canada, as a protest movement against the military dictatorship. It was then known as the PAK (the Panhellenic Anti-dictatorship Movement). In the words of many of the opposition members, PASOK is not really a party but a movement. The reason PASOK does not want to establish itself in the customary form of a regular political party, according to many of my respondents, is the lack of consistency in its political ideology. PASOK is more innovative and flexible. The embodiment of PASOK is its charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, who was arrested on the eve of military dictatorship on April 21, 1967, and then released by the coup-makers in response to worldwide pressure from the academic community. Opposition to military dictatorship thus started as an anti-junta movement

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abroad (PAK). This developed into the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which has for some years been the governing socialist party of Greece.

Integration of political élites takes place within each party and does not cross political lines. Even within each political party there are degrees of political integration. The more committed the members are to a party ideology or to a political leader, the more integrated and cohesive the political élite. What unites most PASOK political élites are their attachment to their political leader and their share of political ideology and political activism. PASOK political élites are still in the making. With the exception of three or four PASOK cabinet ministers, PASOK politicians are little known beyond the political district they represent. The entrepreneurial model of élite recruitment and integration is depicted diagrammatically in figure 1.

There are three sets of characteristics relating to the integration of the political élites in Greece. The *first* set includes ascriptive/sociodemographic factors (age, cohort generation, sex, education, region, social class, and the like). The *second* includes characteristics such as opportunity, associational, and sociometric ties, and client-patron relations. Both of these sets represent the pulling factors which pull political eligibles and political activists toward a particular political party or movement. The *third* set of factors includes such pushing sociopsychological and dynamic factors as motivation, ambition, ability, political efficacy. All three sets of factors, or ABC, interact with each other to explain élite recruitment and integration. AB and AC represent the pulling factors, while BC (the base) represents the pushing factors. A tripartite model of political recruitment is depicted in Fig. 2. In contrast with the governing political party (PASOK), the other two parties do not have any governing political élites on the executive cabinet level. Members of the PASOK cabinet and the committee chairman are recruited from the pool of activists and subélites.

For purposes of brevity, the concepts of recruitment and

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Fig. 1. An Entrepreneurial Model of Recruitment and Integration of Political Élites



Fig. 2. A Tripartite Model of Political Recruitment in Greece



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integration will be discussed simultaneously within each political party or movement.

PASOK

The recruitment and integration of PASOK legislative and ministerial political élites is dominated by the party's charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of Greece and chairman of PASOK. Papandreou is the integrating force of his political movement. Most PASOK legislative and ministerial political élites are new people with little or no political experience. With a few exceptions the majority of PASOK recruits, especially on the ministerial, key legislative, and committee levels, are those who are faithful and adhere to the political ideology of PASOK. This ideology is a mixture of neo-nationalism, Third World socialism, and "New Deal" American legislative reform. The political integration of PASOK legislative and ministerial élites is facilitated not only by its strong political and charismatic leader but by the pulling and pushing factors of political forces at work both in Greece proper and abroad. The threat of Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean unites both the people and its political élites. PASOK, more than the New Democracy, favors change and legislative reform. It reflects a demographic and political shift within the Greek electorate. It is a movement of the lower and lower middle classes, the small farmers, small businessmen, and young professionals. It is a political party/movement of the less privileged classes of Greek society. With a few exceptions PASOK has managed to keep its supporters intact. Those who disagreed with PASOK and its leadership left the movement and joined either the communist party (at least one former minister who resigned joined and was elected on the communist ticket) or the New Democracy (two brothers and a former general left PASOK and ran on the ticket of New Democracy). The latter disagreed with PASOK because of the abolition of the "cross of preference" of deputies. PASOK as the governing party abolished the cross of political preference from constituents

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who elected their local deputy. The deputies now are elected nationally. This means that the party leader has more power to select who is going to be on the slate and thus control his legislative and cabinet members. The argument made by PASOK for abolishing the cross was the tendency of Greek politicians and the Greek electorate to establish client-patron relations which were perceived as favoring the more privileged classes of Greece (Mouzelis 1978, Kourvetaris/ Dobratz 1984b). Almost all New Democracy deputy respondents saw the abolition of the cross as a decline in the representative nature of the legislature, and an increase of the power of the executive branch of government. However, PASOK argued that the abolition of constituency preference helped the country "by undermining clientelism and thus strengthening democracy."

In legislative matters, deputies follow the party line and, in most issues, vote as a block. As a group the PASOK deputies and ministers are young, inexperienced, but ambitious and highly motivated. They follow their leader more faithfully and conform to the party line. Those who find reason to disagree with PASOK policies either resign or are forced out of the party. In this way PASOK maintains its unity.

The ideology of the socialist party is defined in a booklet known as the Declaration of the 3rd of September, 1974, which lays down the fundamental principles and aims of the Panhellenic Socialist movement. A translation of this document from Greek into English is contained in the book by Spourdalakis (1988: 288-296). Although often stridently anti-Western and anti-American, PASOK did not fulfill its threat to take Greece out of NATO and EEC or to close down the American bases in Greece as it threatened to do in the 1981 pre-election campaign. During the 1985 pre-election campaign, PASOK chose to play down foreign issues. In general, however, PASOK tends to be more critical of U.S. government policies than New Democracy.

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New Democracy

New Democracy is the progeny of the "old right," which adopted its present name to attract voters and has modified its political ideology somewhat to adjust to changing political circumstances. Yet it still represents the people who have dominated Greek politics for most of the 150 years of Greece's independence from Turkey. New Democracy, like PASOK has a left, a center, and a right faction. For the last few years, it has moved to capture the old center, which was eclipsed during the 1981 national elections and Euroelections of June 1984 and again in the 1985 national elections. The founder and former leader of the New Democracy is Constantine Caramanlis, a former prime minister and former president of Greece. Mr. Constantine Mitsotakis has since become the leader of New Democracy after Evangelos Averoff resigned from the party for reasons of health and age. Mitsotakis was elected to the leadership of the New Democracy with a 70-41 vote of the 111-member parliamentary group of his party, and he was re-elected again in 1985. Mitsotakis and Papandreou share a mutual hatred for each other which goes back to 1965.

Constantine Mitsotakis is a senior politician who has been active in politics for a long time. He became the archrival of the present prime minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, in 1965 when he and a number of deputy members of the Center Union Party of the late prime minister George Papandreou, the father of the present prime minister and chairman of PASOK, defected from the party over a dispute regarding the ministry of defense portfolio. After the fall of Papandreou's Center Union government, the Center Union split, and Mitsotakis became the leader of the anti-Papandreou faction of the party, known as the *apostates*. According to many PASOK politicians and students of modern Greek politics, the defection of these Center party politicians generated a series of political intrigues led by the then King Constantine, which culminated in the military dictatorship of April 21, 1967. As a result, Andreas

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Papandreou has accused Mitsotakis of being responsible for the 1967 military dictatorship and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974.

New Democracy suffers from an identity problem of leadership. The departure of its aging leader Constantine Caramanlis *and* elderly leaders has created a vacuum and internal dissension problem. For the last fourteen years, New Democracy changed leadership four times. The departure of Constantine Caramanlis resulted in a struggle for political power within the party and its ability to face PASOK was and still is the major issue among the contenders of political power of the second largest political party of Greece.

The New Democracy party was found to be less cohesive in its top political leadership but more cohesive at the legislative deputy level. On the élite political power level one could discern at least five political factions within the New Democracy Party. Three of the political leaders were in their 70s and two were in their 50s. In the 1981 national elections, George Rallis, former prime minister and a son of a former prime minister of the time of the German occupation, ran against Andreas Papandreou and lost. Mr. Evangelos Averoff, a former minister of foreign affairs and national defense, was elected chairman of the New Democracy party. In the June 17, 1984, Euroelections, in his bid to defeat PASOK, Mr. Averoff and his party failed to win the majority of the votes, although his party elected nine deputies (including himself), with PASOK electing ten, and the rest going to the communists except for one elected by the EPEN – the far right party. In New Democracy, Mr. Averoff was later replaced by Mr. Mitsotakis.

The system of recruitment of New Democracy deputies follows the party's conservative political ideology. Overall the members of the New Democracy political élite were found to be more experienced, more well-to-do, and older than their PASOK counterparts. Despite the election of a number of young and dynamic new deputies, the New Democracy party still has the public image of a conservative political

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party which favors the rich and the more privileged classes of Greece. However, more recently the New Democracy Party was split between the old guard, headed by Mitsotakis, and the forces of Constantine Stephanopoulos, a younger and more dynamic New Democracy politician who represents a force for renewal within the New Democracy Party.

KKE

The most integrated and committed political élite is the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Organized strictly on the political ideology of Marxism-Leninism, rather than on the basis of loyalty to a single charismatic leader, the Greek communists of the Exterior stress a world view along the traditional Soviet model, whereas the Eurocommunist Party of the Left follows a more independent national course. The Communists are very much a minority in parliament, and their policies remain anti-Western, anti-NATO, anti-American, and anti-capitalist. It is critical both of New Democracy and PASOK.

As the old Marxists die out due to age, new recruits are coming to the party. The communists are strong amongst the working class, particularly those of a refugee and factory background. But many young recruits are found among high school and university students and the KKE draws about 10 to 12 percent in any given national election or Euroelection. In 1968 it was split into the KKE (Exterior) and KKE (Interior or Party of the Left). The latter is much smaller and draws the more intellectually and professionally oriented Greeks to its ranks. It is similar to the Eurocommunist political parties of Italy and France, and it is independent of Russia. It is critical of all three major political parties including the KKE. It is against the politics of polarization and supports the EEC in the interest of the "European working class." It declares itself to be against any hegemony or paternalism from either the East or West. In some ways it is similar to PASOK. The Eurocommunists are an offset of KKE who follow a more independent line and are critical of

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the monolithic posture of KKE. They support the political and economic integration of European nations. Communists who run for deputies are recruited from the membership of the communist party, and they must show allegiance to the principles of Marxism and be pro-Soviet in their policies.

Since the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974, the KKE has been recognized and has participated in the national elections, Euroelections, and municipal elections. Over a period of fourteen years the KKE has not increased its voting power. Its leader Charilaos Florakis is an old warrior and stout pro-Russian communist who opposes the U.S., NATO, EEC, and Western European and American capitalism. By international standards the Communist Party of Greece is more conservative and orthodox in its ideology than the Russian communist party itself. The leadership and its deputies are held together by its anti-Western, anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-EEC posture. It is critical of the New Democracy, PASOK, and the Eurocommunists. Some of its members are well known internationally. Mikis Theodorakis, for example, the internationally known composer, was a deputy of the KKE. The KKE draws from the hard core working class, the students, those who were victimized during the civil war and the military dictatorship, the unemployed, the underemployed, and the descendants of Asia Minor refugees.

Conclusions, Propositions, and a Commentary

In this paper an effort was made to explore the issues of recruitment and integration of political élites in Greece – no effort was made to operationalize the major concepts. An entrepreneurial model of recruitment and integration and a tripartite model of recruitment were suggested. PASOK, like New Democracy before it, was founded and built on the personality of one man, Constantine Caramanlis. Like Caramanlis, Andreas Papandreou, the chairman of PASOK and prime minister of Greece, has become the leading political personality and force in modern Greek politics.

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PASOK is a political party in the making and is synonymous with its charismatic leader. Papandreou has followed somewhat similar paths of establishing his political power as Constantine Caramanlis did before him.

Political élite integration was achieved as long as Caramanlis was in full control of his political party. However, it began to disintegrate when he decided to step down from his party and assume the presidency of the Greek Republic. Since his departure from the top leadership of his party his successors have not succeeded in uniting the party and leading New Democracy to victory. One can suggest that the New Democracy Party faces the same problem as the Democratic Party in the United States. The difference, however, is that while in the United States politics and the electorate have been moving toward neo-conservatism for the last ten years or so in Greece and other Mediterranean European societies (Spain, Portugal), politics and the electorate are moving to the left. It is not by accident that all three nations have socialist governments following the collapse of military dictatorships and the disengagement of the military élites from civilian politics.

Greece along with other Mediterranean European societies have been divided by a host of issues in the past — royalists vs republicans, church vs the state, political left vs political right. Greece has experienced many military coups, countercoups, civil wars, revolts in its recent political history. Following the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 and the collapse of the military dictatorship, the New Democracy Party opened the door for a shift in Greek politics — from the political right to the political left. New Democracy and its leader Constantine Caramanlis restored democracy and recognized the Communist Party.

Élite political factionalism is the norm rather than the exception in modern Greek politics. Élite factionalism led to the downfall of the Center Union government in 1965, which in turn led to the military dictatorship takeover April 21, 1967. The more cohesive and integrated a political élite the

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greater the likelihood for institutional stability. Likewise, the less cohesive a political élite is the greater the likelihood of political instability. Stability, however, does not always contribute to freedom and human rights. Stability can be brought up by a military dictatorship as in most countries in the Third World at the expense of democracy and freedom. Democracy is better served when unity and cohesiveness are achieved through diversity and not through conformity. Diversity is the lifeblood of democracy. Élite political integration is more characteristic of oligarchical political regimes. The greater the openness and the more democratic the political regime and its élites the less the cohesiveness and integration of the political leadership.

Charismatic political leadership is characteristic of those societies undergoing a crisis and intense social change. Greece is a society in transition, a nation in search of an identity, from a traditional society to a modern, industrialized nation (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987). The greatest problem charismatic political leaders face is the problem of succession when the political leader who holds the party together dies or retires. This was true of New Democracy. It is suggested that unless PASOK moves away from charismatic politics, in due time, it will, like New Democracy, face the problems of a political vacuum and internal dissension.[2]

According to Lipset (1981), parties of representation (as compared to parties of integration) are less likely to resort to political extremism. In countries in which parties of representation exist (Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian), and cross-pressures are allowed to operate, there is a greater chance for democracy. The opposite is also true. In military dictatorships and one party states, where cross pressures are not allowed to operate, there is less chance for democracy and a greater intensity of political extremism. Lipset argues that a two party system is more likely to have a low political intensity than a multiparty system. A two party system is more stable politically, it exhibits less ideological political conflict and permits more political compromise than a multi-

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party system. Greece has a multi-party system, therefore one must expect Greece's political system to be more unstable and conflict prone.

Political activists within a political élite are more likely to hold intense political beliefs and attitudes than non-activists, and as such political activism within a political élite is a deterrent to élite integration. Greek political élites must try to minimize political passions not only during elections but also during debates in the *Voule*. The political leaders must show more integrity and devotion to their country. Political parties and political leaders must lead the nation and not divide it into polarized political factions.

Who runs or who is appointed to a political office is important. The criteria for such an appointment or election must be public trust, competence, public service and dedication to the ideals of democracy, freedom, and human rights. The common good and national interest must guide those in positions of authority. Greece as a nation, society, and culture is too important to be left to the political intrigues of charismatic personalities. The Greeks invented politics in the sense that they were the first to introduce participatory democracy and legislative politics. To cite Pericles' notion of Athenian democracy "Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs, but in the affairs of the state as well....we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all."

Footnotes

1. Most recently a number of general works on Greek politics and the Greek socialists have been published. Richard Clogg's *Parties and Elections in Greece* (1987) is a post World War II historical survey of parties and elections in Greece. In his introduction to *The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party* (1988), Michalis Spourdalakis states that his book is an effort "to explain the failure of PASOK to reach its (radical) potential and fulfill its promises" (1988:1). Another book is by Nicholas Stavrou *Greece Under Socialism*, Caratzaas Brothers, New York, London, 1988.

George Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz's *A Profile of Modern Greece in Search of Identity* (1987) is a general book on Greek social institutions including modern Greek politics. The analysis and interpretations are based on social science research of the

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last 25 years.

2. Such dissension is already present following the recent banking scandal known as the Koskotas affair. Indeed, the Koskotas banking scandal has badly shaken the Papandreou government and has led to many ministerial resignations. A recent "no confidence" motion by the opposition was defeated but new elections are scheduled for June 1989, and many observers believe that Papandreou will lose the elections. The problems of PASOK are the problems of Papandreou himself. He underwent a serious heart operation, and then fell in love with a former stewardess half his age, abandoning his American born wife. At present it would seem that it will require a miracle for Papendreou and PASOK to survive this series of political and personal crises.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY

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Within post-colonial African societies the initial determinant for the creation of new public enterprises and the modification and perpetuation of the existing former colonial parastatal boards tends to be the nature of the colonial relationship and the circumstances within which national political independence was achieved.

Where the colonial socio-economic relationship tended to be pervasive (e.g. in the so-called "colonies of settlement" such as Kenya and Zimbabwe) with the economy dominated by the colonial state through parastatal bodies, and by the representatives of European commercial/mercantile companies, individual European merchants, syndicates etc., complemented by "pariah" entrepreneurs of Lebanese (e.g. in West Africa) or Asian (e.g. in East Africa) origin, the colonial economy offered little scope for the development of a vigorous indigenous entrepreneurial class. Apart from the competitively stifling influence of these established and powerful foreign entrepreneurs on the development of indigenous entrepreneurs, in some cases such as Kenya and Zimbabwe the colonial state had actively instituted legal statutes specifically to exclude the development of indigenous entrepreneurs in any significant commercial line outside petty trade. In general, European commercial groups dominated the commanding heights of colonial commerce viz., wholesale import and export, bulk retailing etc. The "pariah" entrepreneurs operated immediately below these colonial commercial giants, breaking down the bulk-retailed goods into smaller units for distribution among the in-

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digenous African population. These entrepreneurs performed the same complementary or mediatory role vis-a-vis the externally-oriented export trade; i.e. they collected small units of African produce into sizeable quantities for onward transmission to the European commercial companies for bulk export. The mediatory role of this entrepreneurial group, coupled with inhibiting colonial legislation, reduced the chances for the development of any indigenous entrepreneurial group.

Having been excluded from the lucrative lines of colonial commerce, there remained no viable economic sector outside agriculture on which the indigenous population could attempt capital accumulation. The colonial bureaucracy in general similarly precluded the possibility for the development of a viable indigenous corps of administrative officials. Consequently, this combination of economic and extra-economic factors had the overall effect of depriving local entrepreneurs of both the capital resources and the commercial opportunity to launch viable entrepreneurial activities.

In these circumstances, where the colonial social, economic and political relationship tended to be pervasive, dominating the distributive and often even the productive sectors, including the machinery of the state, such economies tended to be socially underdeveloped, with no distinct, dominant, entrepreneurial social force capable of effectively supplanting the European commercial houses following independence. In other words, the critical element in the relationship depended on whether during the colonial period an indigenous entrepreneurial group had managed to rise out of petty colonial commerce to the point where it might hope to either cooperate or contend with the dominant colonial commercial interests.

In the majority of African countries, no viable entrepreneurial group had developed as a dominant socio-economic force at the time of independence.[1] The colonial petty traders had not manifested themselves or established a meaningful grip on industry, trade or even in

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the state apparatus of the colonial system. They had not reached a level of development where they could assume effective control of the post-colonial state and take over the economic functions previously fulfilled by expatriate commercial interests.[2]

Thus at the time of independence, foreign capital was a very powerful force in many African countries, and this situation did not change significantly after independence. The nascent local entrepreneurial class did not acquire dominant control over the economy through either state-owned or private institutions and foreign capital was not immediately reduced to a subsidiary role. In circumstances such as these, where the colonial entrepreneurial groups completely overshadowed and even frustrated the growth of an indigenous entrepreneurial group, the new governments generally resorted to political methods to wrest economic dominance from the hands of expatriate commercial interests. The development of a government sector in the economy through public enterprise was seen to be the answer. In some cases, the creation or expansion of the public sector was couched in terms of socialist ideology, as representing a major instalment in the battle to achieve an equitable distribution of wealth and the creation of an egalitarian society. Other regimes (e.g. Kenya) sought to use public enterprises as guardians for the development of an indigenous post-colonial entrepreneurial group. Such newly created public enterprises were to be eventually broken up, with lucrative commercial niches being filled by nascent local entrepreneurial groups. Sometimes these parastatals sub-contracted operations to individuals or to syndicates of local entrepreneurs, and newly created national banks often acted as conduits through which investment capital was made available to the new entrepreneurs.

Consequently, the specific role of public enterprises in most post-colonial African economics was largely determined by the social forces which underpinned the post-colonial state.[3] The circumstances governing public enterprise, its

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operational performance, and the distribution of its surplus were conditioned and constrained by the interplay of social forces within the polity. This interplay has itself, in particular cases, been conditioned by the presence of external influences on the economic and political processes of specific states. Public enterprises in some West African states, such as Sierra Leone, well illustrate such considerations.

Public Enterprises in Sierra Leone: The Dominant Social Elements in the Colonial Political Economy

In the case of Sierra Leone, the specific role and operation of public enterprises has been largely determined by (i) the nature of the colonial political economy (ii) and the specific socioeconomic and political character of the indigenous mercantile groups which developed during the colonial period and soon came to dominate the post-colonial economy.

The operation of the colonial economy had produced three dominant social groups at the time of independence in 1961. At the top of the colonial society and above all indigenous social groups was the expatriate colonial bureaucracy complemented by expatriate representatives of European merchant capital.[4] These two groups of expatriates did not constitute a class or a ruling class, but where the managerial representatives of metropolitan economic and political interests. They did not themselves *own* significant capital resources or even means of production, but as representatives of metropolitan economic and political interests, they wielded enormous political power. They approximated to what contemporary Western Marxist scholars have termed the "new petty bourgeoisie."[5] The political and economic resources at their disposal were of a delegated nature, emanating from metropolitan commercial and political interests: they constituted the link between expatriate capital and the colonial domestic economy.

Immediately below this group was the "pariah" entrepreneurial group, the Lebanese traders, usually referred

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to in Marxist discourse as the "*comprador* commercial bourgeoisie." The developmental origins of this group were closely associated with the operational policies of the large European merchant firms. Initially, this group possessed only meager capital resources of its own, and up to the Second World War it relied heavily on credit extension by the large European merchant firms. Its function was to facilitate the development and deployment of European merchant capital in small units at the lower levels of the exchange economy.[6]

During the early period, the commercial (*comprador*) functions of this group were restricted to the confines of the colonial economy. They did not wield any political power but their economic existence was indirectly guaranteed by the political protection afforded to the European merchant firms by the colonial government. During and after the Second World War, as a result of nearly thirty years of operation and accumulation of profits, the *comprador* activities of this entrepreneurial group assumed international dimensions.

After World War II, the now wealthy "pariah" trades started to deploy its generation-old capital resources into the international wholesale trade in competition with the European firms. By the time of independence, Lebanese capital had grown sufficiently strong to precipitate the withdrawal of European merchant firms from certain lines of the import trade.[7] But the economic activities of this class had the effect of restricting the growth possibilities of the upper echelons of the indigenous class structure, viz. the indigenous entrepreneurial class or what is termed by Maoists the "petty bourgeoisie."[8] This is because the Lebanese traders operated previously in those sectors of the exchange economy which would have provided an arena of operations for the weak capital resources of any emerging indigenous entrepreneurial class.

Below the Lebanese *comprador* bourgeoisie, but at the apex of the indigenous class structure, was the petty bourgeoisie class, composed largely but not exclusively of petty traders, some of whom doubled up as professionals, such as doctors,

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lawyers, schoolteachers, chiefs, chiefdom officials, petty clerks, petty civil servants etc.[9]

This was a heterogeneous social group still in the process of formation at the time of independence. In the economy, it occupied a position below the *comprador* commercial bourgeoisie but above the peasantry, while in the political field it remained largely confined to the lowest levels of the colonial bureaucracy. It was a weak class both economically and politically.

The meager capital resources of this class were deployed in small scale enterprises such as retail outlets, transport operations, agricultural produce buying etc. However these economic activities were severely restricted by the combined operational strength of Lebanese and European capital. The first significant gains of this class within the colonial system were at the level of politics during the decolonization process, when, between 1959 and 1961, under "responsible government", it governed under colonial tutelage. Thus, at the time of independence the petty bourgeoisie had a heterogeneous class base involving not only the colonial bureaucracy (lower echelons), and the professions, but also different sectors of the commercial economy.

At the level of politics, throughout the Post-Second World War period and up to independence, the petty bourgeoisie never developed any significant manifestations of anti-imperialist sentiment or of a nationalist ideology committed to the severance of socio-economic ties with the imperialist metropolis. Instead, the tone and tempo of "nationalistic" politics was set by struggles among the petty bourgeois for privileged positions in collaboration with the colonial power.

Consequently, the transfer of political power came as a result of political negotiations rather than by any revolutionary struggle by independence "movements" against the colonial power.

No dramatic economic and political break with the colonial power occurred to neutralize the dominant political

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position of the expatriate bureaucracy in the state apparatus or that of expatriate capital in the economy. While expatriate merchant firms continued to operate for some time after independence, many key bureaucratic positions remained in the hands of former colonial bureaucrats. At independence, therefore, the indigenous petty bourgeoisie was not only politically weak, but also lacked an independent economic base.

However, being nominally in charge of the post-colonial state apparatus, this class sought to use state power to create a base for itself in the economy. It aimed at creating state institutions which could compete and effectively challenge the dominance of foreign capital in certain spheres of the economy. It was hoped that public enterprise would create monopolies that would operate in favor of, and strengthen the capital resources at the disposal of, the petty bourgeoisie class as a whole. Public enterprises were thus supposed to be an instrument in class struggle against the dominance of foreign capital, and it was in this context that public enterprise acquired considerable importance as a "development" strategy for Sierra Leone.

The nascent post-colonial entrepreneurial class was not rooted in productive activities such as agriculture, manufacturing industry etc. Instead, it had shallow roots in colonial petty commerce. Consequently, its entrepreneurial aspirations experienced a major thrust in the direction of controlling the circulation and distribution of the available commodities in the wholesale and retail goods sector. This was a sector of the economy where the establishment of a state trading monopoly could easily facilitate the entry of small individual or syndicated indigenous capital units. It was also an area of the economy where relatively small amounts of capital outlay were required to start operations,[10] was characterized by a quick turnover on invested capital, so that both these characteristics were attractive in view of the weak financial base of the petty bourgeoisie. Accordingly, a parastatal organization, The National Trading Corporation,

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was established in 1971, ten years after independence, to control the entire wholesale goods sector.[11]

The National Trading Corporation (NTC)

The National Trading corporation (NTC) was created as a government corporation charged with the responsibility of Africanizing the wholesale trade and specifically to hold a legal monopoly in the importation of consumer goods. The state purposed to play three roles in this venture: 1) The provision of public goods, which, it was argued, could not in the "national interest" be allowed to remain in expatriate hands: 2) Intervention to correct what was perceived as imperfections in the market economy, dominated as it was by foreign capital: 3) And finally, to effect a more equitable distribution of national wealth.

The fulfillment of each of these objectives obviously required the government to spend money which was not always available. Consequently, government intended to partially use private capital to create a public enterprise. It offered Le 500,000 of shares of which seventy-five percent were to be held by government institutions and indigenous entrepreneurs and twenty-five percent were to be held by foreign enterprises.[12]

Ironically, it was the old established colonial trading houses such a SCOA, PZ, UAC, Chanrai, Chelleram, Choitram and the Freetown Cold Storage, against which the National Trading Company was supposed to compete and which it was intended to ultimately displace, who subscribed to this initial share capital of the parastatal.

The National Trading Corporation was to accomplish its objective of Africanization by receiving a monopoly from the government to import certain goods (particularly foodstuffs) in bulk and then appointing African wholesalers as subagents or distribute them directly to African retailers and wholesalers. In addition to all these functions the National Trading Corporation was itself to operate retail shops. It took over the Kingsway Stores, formerly owned by the United

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Africa Company (UAC), in Freetown and established a provincial branch at the town of Bo.

However, the National Trading Corporation failed to fulfil the functions which it was intended to perform. Its undoing was precisely due to the absence of a viable, local entrepreneurial class capable of taking advantage of the corporation's monopoly to drive expatriate capital out of the trade lines to which the monopoly applied. Indigenous entrepreneurs who became agents of the company took advantage of the monopoly created for them by the corporation and started creating artificial shortages which drove prices up, resulting in reduced sales. In addition, the company began to operate at heavy losses due to outright embezzlement and bad debts owed by the entrepreneurs. By May 1974,[13] after only three years of operation, the National Trading Corporation recorded a net loss of Le 434,793. The state's response to the financial crisis consisted of moves to reorganize the company. The managing director was dismissed and the NTC's trading monopoly was terminated. This move only served to deepen the crisis. The new managing director, a Ghanaian whose services were obtained through the Commonwealth Secretariat, was charged with the responsibility of putting the NTC on a viable footing and also to reorganize and streamline its operations.

However, when the government decided to terminate the NTC monopoly, the old established trading houses simply reopened their independent import lines naturally choosing to order their own goods through their own head offices abroad rather than through the nearly defunct NTC. This development not only saturated the market, but more disastrously the NTC found itself unable to compete, while holding large amounts of perishable stock both in its stores and at the Freetown docks. As a result, most of the goods had to be disposed of at prices well below the original procurement costs.[14]

In addition, government had to negotiate with the expatriate trading companies for sales to their counterparts

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in neighboring states. Subsequently, SCOA and the UAC were able to transfer substantial quantities of foodstuffs to Benin and Nigeria. After the reorganization and financial stabilization, the NTC has now become more of an autonomous state trading company engaged in wholesale and retail trade as an end in itself rather than a state trading corporation charged with the specific task of constituting a viable launching pad for the development of an indigenous commercial bourgeoisie. The attempt to create an indigenous entrepreneurial class by legal statute through the creation of a public enterprise had failed disastrously.

In conclusion, it is quite clear that the creation of public enterprise and the distribution and generation of surplus from public enterprises depends on the character of the dominant social forces and their control of the state apparatus. Although the establishment of the NTC was based on the rhetoric of nationalism and the equitable distribution of wealth, it is quite clear that the corporation was intended to be an instrument for channelling economic resources to the petty bourgeoisie, a class which had a strong representation in the post-colonial state apparatus.

The surplus was intended to boost the fledgling accumulation base of the petty bourgeoisie to a point whereby that class was sufficiently strong economically to successfully effect entry into the ranks of the commercial bourgeoisie. But the strategy of profit maximization (through the NTC) chosen by the petty bourgeoisie proved to be disastrous to the NTC. In mixed economies such as that of Sierra Leone, with a small business base, the dominant class, i.e. the petty bourgeoisie, acquired a vested interest in the promotion of commodity scarcities so that it could profit from the monopoly granted by the government. Ironically, these commercial activities undermined a parastatal which was supposed to constitute the backbone of that class's attempt to neutralize expatriate capital in the wholesale goods sector. In the final analysis, the distribution of surplus generated through the NTC, depended on the balance of power among

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the social forces in society. In the case of the NTC the balance in favor of the petty bourgeoisie stemmed from access to political power and or ownership of a modicum of initial capital resources. The surplus from the public enterprise was expropriated by those forces with a privileged access to the resources offered by the state monopoly.

Footnotes

1. For example, in the case of Kenya and Tanzania, See Leys, C. *Underdevelopment in Kenya*. London 1974 and Shivji., *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, London 1976.
2. Shivji, *Class Struggles, op. cit.*
3. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya, op. cit.* for and analysis of the crucial role played by foreign capital in the setting of some of the public enterprises in Kenya.
4. See Mukonoweshuro, E. G. *Politics and Class Formation in Sierra Leone 1896-1980* University of Birmingham Ph.D Thesis 1982 pp. 270-275, for a detailed analysis of the processes of colonial class formation.
5. Poulantzas, N. *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, New Left Books, London, 1975 pp. 287-296.
6. For an analysis of the commercial activities of the Lebanese see Laan van der H. L. *The Lebanese in Sierra Leone*, Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1975.
7. See Laan der H. L. *European Commercial Enterprises in Sierra Leone: A Preliminary Survey*, London 1987.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Porter, A. *Creoledom*, Oxford University Press 1962.
10. Mukonoweshuro, *Politics and Class Formation, op. cit.*
11. See *West Africa*, 30 April, 1971.
12. *Ibid.*, 11 June 1971.
13. *Ibid.*, 20 May 1974.
14. *Ibid.*

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THE TRAGEDY OF TIBET

By Eva M. Neterowicz

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Contents

Chapter 1: Tibetan Society and Culture
Chapter 2: Tibet Enters the Twentieth Century
Chapter 3: The Communists Tighten Their Control
Chapter 4: The Tragedy Escalates
Chapter 5: Tibet Faces Present Challenges

This monograph presents an account of the events leading to the Chinese invasion of Tibet, which quickly swamped the brave resistance of the small and outdated Tibetan army, but met with no resistance from the international community, despite Tibetan appeals for help to various powers, including India, Britain and the United Nations.

It explains the Chinese control over the Panchen Lama, and the initial efforts of the Dalai Lama to mitigate the evils of Chinese occupation.

It explains how the inability of the Dalai Lama to protect the Tibetan peoples and culture from the far-reaching plans of the occupiers led to the Dalai Lama's final decision to flee the country on foot, escaping through the forests and mountain ranges to India, escorted only by a small detachment of loyal Tibetan guards and his closest advisors.

The extent of Chinese acts of oppression is described, and evidence is introduced to support the charges that Peking plans to use Tibet as an area for colonial resettlement of the excess Chinese mainland population. The various revolts of the Tibetan peoples are listed, and eyewitness accounts given by Western visitors of the savage reaction by Chinese troops and police are cited. Historic monasteries containing priceless antique treasures were shelled by the Chinese miliary, and Tibet's unique cultural history was particularly targeted for destruction during the so-called Cultural Revolution.

The author notes the attempts made by Peking since the cultural revolution to rebuild some monasteries, but to replace the existing Buddhist monks by a new breed of monks preaching a form of communism under the guise of Buddhism. The continued attempts of the monks and the peoples to retain their sense of Tibetan identity and culture are traced up to January 1989, and the unrelenting and vicious suppression of all and every public demonstration by the occupying military is recorded.

The text is accompanied by a useful map of Greater Tibet, showing the invasion route taken by the Chinese army, and areas of Tibet which have been expropriated into other provinces of the People's Republic of China as well as the relatively small area which is today regard as the 'province' of Tibet. As an appendix, the Monograph includes two informative resolutions of the U.S. Congress, documenting the misdeeds of the PRC military and government, and calling freedom and self-determination for the Tibetan people.

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INTELLECTUALS AND DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Mehran Kamrava
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica

Third World intellectuals, the main social class responsible for educating and guiding their society, have become alienated from their surroundings and cut off from their people, an alienation brought on mostly by the intellectuals themselves. This lack of communication between intellectuals and their peoples is one the most important social factors underlying the continual appearance of dictatorial regimes in the Third World. To reverse this trend, Third World intellectuals need to put an end to the gap between themselves and their society, reassert social and cultural influence, and to begin educating their peoples and, more importantly, re-educating themselves.

Intellectuals, Democracy and Freedom in the Third World

Dictatorships have long been an inseparable feature of many Third World governments. While both the West and the Eastern bloc countries have had their own share of dictatorial regimes, the "Third World" has become synonymous with power-hungry dictators and despotic political systems. The task of this essay is two-fold: (1) to see whether there are dominant social and cultural characteristics within Third World societies that are particularly conducive to the development of dictatorships, and (2) to explore possible solutions for preventing the occurrence of cycles of political despotism in those societies. The solution, it will be argued, has much to do with Third World intellectuals. It is first necessary to briefly outline the predominant nature of political systems found in the Third World.

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One of the most important reasons for the continued emergence of dictatorial regimes in the Third World lies in the manner in which the political cultures of almost all Third World countries have historically developed. By definition, political culture dwells on the political realm on the one hand and on the plane of society on the other. It refers to socially shared experiences and values of a community in specific relation to the political system. Through historical accumulation and common acceptance, such commonly held values form a general frame of reference within which political sentiments and activity are formulated and expressed. Similar to the more general culture, political culture embodies a strong sense of historical continuity (Pye 1971, p.104). It involves more than episodic and fragmentary political events and embodies considerable regularity through time and national experience. At the same time, it allows for differences in political values and orientations while maintaining overall uniformity it its principal axioms.

Defined as such, the political culture of most Third World countries has excluded democratic practices and political institutions. In almost all Third World countries, political authority and power have historically rested with narrow oligarchies and élites – such as colonial administrators, members of a single family, or the higher echelons of a military establishment – and political control and authority are often exercised informally and through personal connections instead of through the regular institutional and administrative networks. While such governments often try to cultivate popular support and at times even achieve some measure of legitimacy among their population, their reign relies not on popular consensus but on the strength of their governing institutions and on their ability to effectively suppress challenges from political contenders. Third World governments continuously try to develop more effective methods in order to maintain and to institutionalize their powers and privileges in the face of hostile challenges from within their own societies and from an overwhelmingly deter-

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minant international environment.

It is within such political infrastructures that social and political values are developed in the Third World and attitudes and views toward the practice of politics are formed. Naturally, such regimes are neither conducive to the free expression of political opinion nor are they particularly healthy testing grounds for the maturation of political principles and practices. To blame the absence of democracy on tyrants who govern through coercive means is, however, tautological and not entirely accurate. Third World intellectuals are as much to blame as are the dictators who rule over them.

The Role of Third World Intellectuals

Instead of being defined as an economic class, based on their position in the means and the relations of economic production, intellectuals are defined in relation to the dominant social and cultural values of society. Intellectuals are qualified, and are accepted as qualified, to speak on matters of cultural concern (Nettl 1970, pp.89-90). As opposed to the intelligentsia, the more general group to which they belong, intellectuals predicate societal action. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, are those who are generally better educated than other social classes but who do not necessarily call for socio-cultural change or embark on political activities (Nettl 1970, p.90). There are two spheres within which intellectuals exert their influence: the political as well as the social. Politically, intellectuals are an essentially oppositional group who speak against the prevailing cultural frame of their society and who choose deliberately to estrange themselves from the dominant cultural superstructure (Feuer 1976, p.48). Such estrangement often arises out of the intellectuals' alienation from their surrounding environment and from other social groups with whom they cannot communicate and for whom they remain largely enigmatic. Their social alienation and their inability to be assimilated in their society often leads them to oppose the political order

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and to view themselves as leaders of a future political movement (Feuer 1976, p.51). Socially, intellectuals elicit, guide, and express the dispositions of society (Shils 1970, p.30). By doing so, they can either challenge and question or reinforce and strengthen those norms and values around which matters of social and political controversy revolve.

Thus defined in relation to social and cultural values, the role that intellectuals play in modernizing countries differs from that of intellectuals in the more advanced and industrially developed ones. Since modernization requires the transformation of both the cultural values and the industrial infrastructure of a society, intellectuals in modernizing countries acquire a special relationship to the rapidly changing body of social and cultural values. In modernizing societies, the intellectuals' support for or opposition to the values at hand is at a more fundamental and grass roots level. Such values have either not been fully adopted by the general public or their adoption and popular routinization is easily challenged by other contending values. In modern societies, in contrast, where values have long been widely adopted and form an integral part of the norms of society, the intellectuals' support for or opposition to such values is not as fundamental to their popular acceptance as is the case in modernizing societies. As the contention between varying norms and values is more polarized in societies that are undergoing modernization, so is the influence of the intellectuals, owing to the nature of their position in relation to those values. The more polarized the divergence among values, and hence the more fragile and precarious their acceptability throughout society, the higher is the importance and significance of intellectuals. As a result, intellectuals in modernizing countries exert a higher degree of social influence than do their counterparts in the West.

In the Third World, intellectuals have become an all but non-existent social class. Despite its academic definition, intellectualdom in the Third World has become a nominally impressive but a realistically ineffectual domain for the

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exertion of social and political influence. Although there have been occasional flares of men of the people — Cuba's los Humildes were a case in point (Matthews 1975, p.94) — Third World intellectuals are as socio-culturally élitist as politicians there are politically. The intellectuals' inability to be assimilated into the system may propel them to embark on dogmatic denunciation of their governments, some may even go so far as to wage the all too familiar armed struggle, while only a few express genuine concern for their immediate social surroundings and are willing to do something about it. Some Third World intellectuals are in fact deeply troubled by the agonizing circumstances that entangle their people and their society. What is essential is to do something about it; others might, Third World intellectuals refuse to or are incapable of rectifying what they perceive to be wrong with their society. Their lethargy is manifest not only by their political passivity but also by their social idleness.

What has caused this potentially resourceful group to be silenced into oblivion and to have turned into an over-paid club of parasites? To blame political despotism for the oblivion of Third World intellectuals and the intellectuals for the absence of democracy is only tautological. What appears to be the core of the problem is not necessarily dictatorship in the Third World but rather ignorance, not the ignorance of the masses but the ignorance of the Third World intellectuals themselves. Third World intellectuals suffer from a seemingly incurable ignorance of ways and means to understand and analyze their own societies and, despite what they like to think of themselves, they have little understanding of the social sciences. They thus invariably equate their dogma with what they think to be a scientific understanding of society. Demagoguery breeds where opinions prevail but knowledge lacks. While Third World intellectuals show off their ideas within their exclusive clubs and cafes, the people of their countries go unaware of the possibilities that might be open to them or of the ways to attain them.

In so far as Third World intellectuals are mostly the

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products of educational systems established by dictatorial governments, their ignorance of the social sciences is somewhat excusable. It is difficult to think of any Third World country which gives its student population a decent education in the social sciences or even in history. However, if they truly deserve the title by which they are classified, i.e. intellectuals, they should be capable of educating themselves. Intellectuals are not only supposed to be more educated than other social classes, they are also supposed to engage in the trading of ideas and in the predication of societal action. In the Third World, however, not only are the intellectuals indolent, their dogmatic sectarianism and sense of self-righteousness leads them to see themselves as already so sufficiently educated as not to need to study further.

Here lies one of the most central causes of the paralysis of democracy in the Third World: the lack of education of those who are themselves responsible for the education and the guidance of society.

Democracy and the Third World

What is needed in the Third World is more highly educated intellectuals, better educated about their societies, their people, and about how social and political sciences relate to their own society. Grossly indoctrinated politically, Third World intellectuals need to abandon their blind demagoguery and their sense of exclusivity and cultural superiority. I refer not to the politicization of intellectuals, but rather to the need for self-motivated socialization and assimilation into their respective societies. This ought not to be too taxing as it only asks for a practical reaffirmation of the intellectuals' theoretical characterization. Political culture, it was said at the beginning, is one of the main reasons why dictators keep re-appearing in the Third World. This is not to assert that the imposition of a certain blend of political cultures will necessarily result in democracy or in dictatorship. Democracy is a manner of political practice which needs to be socially accepted and observed. Third

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World dictators are unlikely to superimpose democracy on their populace: it is up to intellectuals to give it grass roots acceptance. Political culture does not automatically bring democracy, neither does political socialization nor indoctrination; but if Third World intellectuals start by democratizing themselves, those who look up to them are likely to do the same. Political despotism at the institutional level is readily observable in the Third World. What is less apparent but as equally prominent is despotism and intolerance at the societal level. It is deep within their societies — at levels such as the neighborhood, community, and schools and universities — that Third World intellectuals must aim, thus teaching and ingraining the principles of democracy throughout their societies. Then at least the conflict will be one between democratized societies and dictatorial regimes rather than between dictatorial societies and dictatorial regimes.

Third World intellectuals must first begin by educating themselves and then educate their societies. This will not be easy, for it is neither easy for an intellectual to swallow the idea that he or she is uneducated nor is it easy to read and write freely and without fear in most parts of the Third World. It is difficult to see, however, how any government can prevent individuals from learning to be tolerant of those with different views. A concurrent rise in the level of mass literacy would help, but that is dependent on political variables over which most intellectuals have little control. Yet so long as the masses remain illiterate and the intellectuals uneducated, Third World dictators will continue to maximize their political longevity.

Freedom in the Third World is not an impossibility. At the same time, international factors significantly affect the political configuration of most Third World governments. Nevertheless, if freedom is ever to grow in the Third World, it is more likely to result from indigenous initiatives than from the efforts of liberal Western politicians. And if this freedom is to be sustained and be of a meaningful nature, its principles must be respected by both the intellectuals and

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by the public they guide. Politics not withstanding, greater education for intellectuals seems to be one of the main social requisites for achieving democracy in the Third World.

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CUBAN POLITICAL ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES

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These are uncertain times for Fidel Castro Ruz. Concerned over developments in Moscow which might conceivably lead to a reduction in the estimated four billion dollar annual Soviet subsidy to Havana, the Cuban leader has initiated a diplomatic offensive which is designed in large part to persuade the U.S. Government to relax its embargo.

Accordingly Castro is concentrating on a campaign of political action aimed at softening U.S. hostility to his government. In his recent interviews with U.S. journalists he has soft-pedaled his role as a promoter of wars of national liberation and accented the need to foster hemispheric cooperation. In addition, he has employed members of the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) who are attached to the Cuban Mission to the U.N. and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington to urge selected members of Congress, the media, and academia to speak out for rapprochement.

There are signs that Castro's efforts are making progress. At the recent inauguration of President Carlos Andres Perez in Caracas, former President Jimmy Carter embraced the Cuban leader to the discomfort of Vice President Quayle. Also, after a three and a half hour meeting with Castro in November, Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced his intention to introduce legislation which would promote an improvement in relations between Washington and Havana.

Whether or not the current campaign is successful, it is not the first nor the most extensive effort by Havana to shape a favorable opinion of the Cuban revolution in the U.S. The initial attempt began within a year of Castro's

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seizure of power and was aimed at workers and intellectuals. However, it was only brought to the attention of the public at large by the assassination of a president.

When he was arrested on 22 November 1963 as the prime suspect in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Lee Harvey Oswald had in his possession among other items a Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) pamphlet issued in New Orleans and bearing the name "Alek Hidell" together with Oswald's name beneath it.

A report prepared a month earlier by the FBI office in New Orleans indicated that a membership card issued to Oswald by the New Orleans chapter of the FPCC on 26 June 1963 was signed by "A. J. Hidell." On 9 August Oswald was arrested for handing out FPCC flyers which also bore the name "Hidell."[1] Subsequent investigations evidenced that "Hidell" was an alias used by Oswald and suggested that he may have created the New Orleans chapter without authorization from the FPCC national organization.[2]

Before Oswald's arrest and the publication of background information on him, including his apparent affiliation with the FPCC, it is safe to say that not one American in a thousand had heard of the organization.

Less than a month after the assassination and Ruby's bizarre murder of Oswald, Richard Gibson, former FPCC acting national executive secretary and head of the New York chapter, volunteered information which he believed might be pertinent to the investigation. According to Gibson, he received a letter during the summer of 1962 from one "Lee Bowmont" in Fort Worth with an enclosed photograph and a newspaper clipping describing activities similar to those of the FPCC and asking for information on the organization. Gibson recalled having sent a routine reply in which he enclosed FPCC literature. He had not presumed "Bowmont" to have been an alias at the time but subsequently came to suspect that "Bowmont" might have been Oswald. Also, according to Gibson, a group of Trotskyites came to his office during the same summer and he later suspected that Oswald

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may have been one of his visitors.[3]

On 1 December 1962, the London *Sunday Telegraph* carried an editorial page item by Washington correspondent Stephen Barber devoted largely to the FPCC. In it Barber quoted Robert Bruce Taber, former executive secretary of the organization, as expressing doubt that incumbent FPCC national chairman Vincent Lee could have had any dealings with Oswald.[4]

What can be affirmed about the mysterious Oswald, the rebellious drifter, is that he came late to the cause, apparently discovering in the Cuban revolution with its drama and romance a worthy substitute for the Soviet Union which he had found to be deadly dull and exceedingly oppressive during his life there from 1959 to 1962. In Fidel Castro, Oswald saw a political leader worthy of an emotional commitment.

When the Batista regime collapsed and Castro's revolutionaries strode in triumph through the streets of Havana, many Americans, including functionaries of the U.S. Mission to Cuba, raised their voices in support of the new order. The victory of the bearded ones would put an end to the crime and corruption of an old style caudillo who had viewed the Pearl of the Antilles as his personal fiefdom. He had drunk too deeply and stayed far too long. Now it was good riddance to bad rubbish.

But what of the new? Since Castro was a skilled poker player who held his cards close to his vest, it was difficult to know. But as 1959 ran its course ominous signs began to appear. Although bloody retribution against Batista's hirelings should have been anticipated, it had a jarring effect on American liberals. Other events proved to be disturbing to well wishers: the squeezing out of technocrats and their replacement by people whose only qualification was loyalty to the maximum leader; Castro's personal reversal of a judicial decision which had found 44 Batista airmen innocent of having committed war crimes; rigorous censorship and growing government control of the media; a blossoming

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Soviet-Cuban relationship at a time when neither Washington nor Havana seemed disposed to offer a positive gesture to one another; and ever-increasing pressure applied to foreign investors.

Early in the year a new U.S. ambassador, Phillip Bonsal, who as assistant secretary of state for the American republics had decided that Castro was not a communist and that correct if not warm relations could be established with him, presented his credentials to the Cuban Foreign Ministry.[5] However, he was to cool his heels for several months before Castro granted him an audience. Nor would the Cuban leader commit himself to measures which might have arrested the deterioration of relations. By fall, Washington was increasingly frustrated with Castro's behavior and suspicious of his intentions. There were disputes among various officials on the scene as to what was occurring, and the writer was sent from Washington to Havana to try to determine the direction of the revolution. The burning issue was whether or not Castro was a communist which, in retrospect, was probably the wrong question. Most officials, even those who had applauded his entry upon the scene, soon came to conclude that even if he was not a communist he might just as well be. By the cumulative evidence of word and deed, he reflected an unremitting hostility toward the U.S. Government and a clear affinity for its enemies at what was then the height of the Cold War. With this judgment the Eisenhower administration and the 87th Congress were in full agreement.

Accordingly it was with concern that members of Congress read a full page advertisement in the 6 April edition of the *New York Times* which urged the public to challenge the "great news agencies" in their negative appraisal of Castroism. Signatories included Simone de Beauvoir, Norman Mailer and critic Kenneth Tynan. (See Appendix).

Within three weeks the Senate Subcommittee on Security (SSS)[6] summoned its first witness to testify on the FPCC. Testifying without apparent reservations and with no outward

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indications of hostility towards his interrogators, Carleton Beals, described in the placement as cochairman, related how Robert Taber, a CBS television and radio reporter, had solicited his support to organize the committee in order to disseminate the truth about the Cuban revolution, beginning with the placement of the advertisement. Beals pleaded ignorance regarding how the committee had been formed and who might have paid for the placement.[7] It was obvious from his extended comments that Beals was an innocent, the sort of person who had been delighted to serve as the nominal head of an organization dedicated to spreading truth.

Subsequent evidence collected by the SSS staff pointed to Taber who, although listed in the placement as a mere member of the FPCC, proved to be the driving force behind its creation. Beginning on 5 May, Taber (an obviously reluctant witness who challenged the jurisdictional authority of the SSS) came to describe how he and a group (*sic*) of his friends got together to combat the distortions of the American media in its coverage of Cuba. Taber, a correspondent and sometime acting editor with some ten years of experience with the network, related how he initially travelled to Cuba in February 1957 and made contact with members of the Civic Resistance in Havana, who arranged for him to return two months later to be escorted clandestinely to the Sierra Maestra to meet Castro. Arriving in the mountains on 29 April, Taber spent some three weeks shooting a film report on Castro and his followers.[8] The results, according to another American reporter who helped to arrange Taber's meetings in Havana, were extraordinary: As Hubert L. Matthews commented, "On 23 April the CBS correspondent, Robert Taber, and a photographer, Wendell Hoffman, with their television equipment, arrived for what Che Guevara called a 'famous interview.' It was shown throughout the U.S. in mid-May as 'The Story of Cuba's Jungle Fighters,' and was invaluable propaganda."[9]

Taber returned to Cuba in April of 1958, where he did a series of radio broadcasts from Santiago, and again during

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the summer of that year, when he interviewed Raul Castro and shot more film.

In January of 1959, shortly after the overthrow of Batista, he flew to Havana, this time on a Cuban government plane. While Taber initially claimed he paid his own expenses, he conceded under questioning that the Cubans had not billed him for the airfare. However, he asserted that when he returned for a second brief visit later that month, he covered all of his expenses, as was the case when he spent three weeks there in April doing research for a book on the revolution. Subsequently, he claimed, he made three visits between January and May 1960 which were all paid for out of his own funds.[10]

Had he ever discussed the formation of the FPCC with Cuban officials? "No, I believe not." Taber responded.[11]

After considerable sparring Taber identified Alan Sagner, whom he described as a businessman from New Jersey, as the cofounder of the FPCC, asserting that there were no other charter members.

On the question of who paid for the *Times* placement, the witness proved to be alternately forgetful and evasive, admitting only that Sagner had written a check for some $400.00 which covered less that 10% of the cost, the total sum of which was $4,725.00.

When asked if he had dealings with Cuban officials in New York, the witness admitted to knowing Raul Roa, son of the foreign minister; Manuel Bisbe, the ambassador to the UN; and a functionary named Primas. Pressed hard, Taber conceded that he might have discussed the placement with one or more of these officials but was not sure that had occurred.[12]

Beyond making these admissions, Taber did little to enlighten the SSS, which didn't appear to press him closely, possibly because the staff was still gathering information and had no clear idea of what had transpired. Although Taber was under suspicion of having committed perjury, the SSS did not arrive at a definitive finding.

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The year 1960 marked a steady deterioration in U.S.-Cuban relations. On 28 June the House of Representatives unanimously approved a bill on the sugar quota which permitted President Eisenhower to reduce the Cuban quota to 700,000 tons, the remaining unfilled portion of Havana's 1960 limit, and by an additional 156,000 tons, a quantity Cuba could have shipped to make up for deficits from other countries. While this tonnage represented only a quarter of the yearly quota, the bill which was promptly signed by the president inflicted a severe blow on the fragile Cuban economy. The same day Castro signed a bill directing the Texaco oil refinery in Santiago to refine Soviet crude or be expropriated. Shortly Nikita Khrushchev announced that Soviet artillerymen, if need be with rockets, would defend the island.

Within a few more months virtually all property owned by American companies had been nationalized and the trickle of Cuban refugees arriving in South Florida had grown into a spate. Meanwhile the president authorized the CIA to support the exiles, a secret (*sic*) that Castro learned about in short order.

Overshadowing the disintegrating relationship was the U.S. electoral campaign in which neither candidate for the White House, Nixon or Kennedy, could afford the appearance of tolerating Cuban excesses even if he might have been privately disposed to try to retrieve the situation. When Kennedy was elected in a squeaker he was not inclined to challenge U.S. policy affecting Cuba as it had been set down by his predecessor.

The worsening of relations had a tendency to focus the attention in a manner that was considerably more precise than had been the case earlier in the year. Less than a fortnight before Kennedy was sworn in as president, a former ally of Taber's in the FPCC offered revealing testimony in open session. Charles A. Santos-Buch, M.D., who described himself as a cofounder of the FPCC along with Taber and Sagner, had undergone a change of heart. The scales had

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fallen from his eyes and he now saw Castro leading Cuba to communism and disaster. Having already heard the witness in closed session, Chairman James Eastland and Chief Counsel J.G. Sourwine knew exactly what to ask him. The doctor, a Cuban citizen with degrees from Cornell and Harvard, offered a detailed description of how, immediately prior to the placement of the *Times* advertisement, Taber and he had met (in what could only have been described as clandestine circumstances) with Raul Roa, who bore a check in the amount of $3,500.00 signed by Ambassador Bisbe; how Roa had cashed the check at the UN; and how Santos-Buch had converted the money into a certified check made out to the newspaper. The witness further asserted that he and Taber had cooked up a story to explain that the money had come from eight of the doctor's friends in the U.S. Finally the witness described how he had participated in the inaugural meeting of the FPCC together with Taber and Sagner, a fact that the former had conveniently overlooked in his official testimony.[13] Three months later, a scant week after the ill-fated landing of Brigade 2506 on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs, Richard Gibson, acting executive secretary of the FPCC and a newswriter for WCBS television and radio in New York, denied the allegation that Taber had been influential in helping him to obtain a CBS network fellowship.[14]

After what can only be termed a *pro forma* challenge of the committee's constitutional authority, Gibson described how Taber, who continued to serve as executive secretary of the FPCC *in absentia*, had been wounded in the fighting at the Bay of Pigs while serving as a correspondent for *Revolucion*, the organ of the 26th of July Movement.[15] It seemed that Gibson knew little about any other Cuban connection of the FPCC.

It wasn't until the following year that the mysterious Taber reappeared before the SSS. Considerably less defiant than he had previously been and apparently concerned over the prospect of being indicted, Taber appeared to suffer from

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serious lapses of memory. Nonetheless he stuck to his original story about the *Times* placement, flatly denying Santos-Buch's version of the events of 1960. More equivocal on the question of the doctor's presence at the founding meeting, Taber pleaded a failure to recollect.[16] Was he still executive secretary? No, he had resigned in December 1962, nearly a year after he had first expressed his intention to do so in writing.[17]

Taber told how he had led a tour of Cuba by FPCC members in December 1960, he had stayed on for a year (*sic*) during which time he was hospitalized for some five and a half months as a result of having been wounded by shrapnel during the invasion and having subsequently developed an hepatic abscess. In addition to serving as a correspondent for *Revolucion* he'd manage to finish his book which was published as *M-26: The Biography of a Revolution* by Lyle Stuart, New York.

Under close questioning Taber admitted to having flown to Prague via Cubana airlines bearing a special Cuban passport and spending a fortnight there as a guest of Ambassador Raul Roa.[18]

Finally, as if to deal the FPCC a mortal blow, the SSS forced Taber to reveal that he had a criminal record dating back to 1939 when he had been sentenced to jail in Ohio for armed robbery, kidnapping, and auto theft.[19] It was an unnecessary inclusion since the FPCC was in sharp decline and would not long survive the Kennedy assassination and Oswald's putative FPCC affiliation. In fact, the failed assault by Brigade 2506 had removed any doubt about the official U.S. attitude towards Castro's Cuba. Whatever quibbling arose after the disaster was essentially what the critics viewed as a loss of nerve by the fledgling Kennedy administration, and what Kennedy's defenders perceived to be a bad CIA plan foisted on the incoming administration by the outgoing one. Nobody who counted disagreed that it would have been a good thing if the invasion had succeeded.

For Castro's part the failed attempt was a singular gift,

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serving to whip up anti-American sentiment and to unify the population. Mutual hostility deepened throughout the spring and summer of 1963 and almost led to Armageddon in October, when the missile crisis threatened global annihilation. By the time the super powers pulled back from the brink of disaster and observers had a chance to review Castro's role in the affair, there were few remaining American voices raised in defense of Cuba. The innocents who made up the rank and file of the FPCC melted away, leaving the field to the professional left, the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Trotskyites.

The FPCC probably reached its apogée in 1961 with chapters in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Tampa, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Palo Alto, Washington, Newark, New Haven, Denver, Cleveland, Seattle, San Diego, Hartford, Lynn, Santa Clara, Brooklyn, Queens, and Bergen County, New Jersey. Student affiliates were active at Antioch, California, CCNY, Stanford, Columbia, Colorado, Brooklyn, Queens, Cornell, UCLA, Fisk, Los Angeles City College, Chicago, Roosevelt, Wisconsin, Carleton, Minnesota, Indiana, Yale, Virginia, Oberlin, Brandeis, Harvard, Washington, Michigan, Wayne State, Brown, MIT, St. Johns, Boston University, University of Ohio, Tufts, Bennington, Goddard, Kansas, and Reed.[20]

In mid-1961 at a three day conference in New York City attended by some 60 "delegates" and several hundred "fraternal delegates" and guests, Gibson described how the FPCC had grown from 30 to some 7,000 people in a little more than a year.[21]

Despite steady growth during its early history, the FPCC early on began to experience what must have been an anticipated problem deriving from the participation of the CPUSA and the SWP which continued to view each other as heresies to be destroyed before the war on capitalism could be won. Evidence of intertribal warfare was made public from time to time. As an example, in October 1961 Berta Green,

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secretary of the national office and of the New York chapter, resigned from both posts as a result of dissent stemming from her membership in the SWP.[22]

However, local conditions dictated the use of flexible tactics. In the case of the Greater Los Angeles chapter there was an element of genuine cooperation between the old antagonists, although both continued to jockey for a dominant position. At its inaugural meeting on 6 January 1961 the chapter issued a broadside condemning the Eisenhower administration for breaking relations with Cuba and appealing to the incoming administration of President Elect Kennedy to restore them. Officers who signed the declaration were Martin Hall, chairman; A.J. Lewis, executive secretary; Gabriela Huesca, recording secretary; and George Davis, treasurer. Additional signatories were the Reverend Stephen W. Frictman, described as honorary cochairman; A.L. Nirin as attorney; Philip Kerby as publisher (*sic*); and Steve Roberts as West Coast representative of the national organization.[23]

Lewis was a veteran functionary of the SWP as was Roberts who, although not a member per se of the chapter, played a key role in its direction. On the other hand, Hull a German-born naturalized American citizen, was a member of the CPUSA and was extensively involved in communist front activities.[24] Many rank and file chapter members were either Trotskyites or orthodox communists.

The truce between sworn enemies can be attributed to the fact that the SWP was especially influential in Southern California and could not easily be dispensed with. The result was a decision by the CPUSA to apply united front tactics in the management of the chapter.

Other chapter reelected local realities as well. In Florida, for example, the Tampa Bay chapter made an appeal to Hispanic Americans, especially to employees of the cigar industry, many of whom were of Cuban origin far removed from the exodus of the early 1960s. Newsletters were bilingual, printed in English and Spanish. However, with the notable exception of the occasional listing of "V.T. Lee" as

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editor,[25] literature produced for public consumption studiously avoided naming officers, probably because of the justifiable fear that they would be intimidated by the refugees and defectors from Castro's Cuba who were arriving and settling down in growing numbers in South Florida. In fact a copy of the chapter newsletter lamented the alleged failure of the police to take action against anti-Castro Cubans who had used strong arm tactics against pro-Castro demonstrators in Ybor City.[26]

The organization of local chapters, as might be expected, involved a relatively small number of people, notably regional directors who were paid regular salaries by the national organization. For example, Robert Shaw, Midwest regional director, was instrumental in founding the Detroit chapter in October 1960 but only after Robert Taber had put in an appearance at a public meeting to describe his personal experiences in Cuba.[27]

The question of what support the Cubans provided after their payment for the famous *New York Times* placement cannot be answered in a definitive way although it appears that subsidies by Havana were modest at best. The fact was that the entire organization from the national office to the local chapters was run on the cheap, correspondence being directed to post office boxes and meetings being conducted in union halls or private homes. Although regional directors were paid salaries, the same was not true for chapter officers. Given the participation of the CPUSA, which was subsidized by its fraternal Soviet party, some money which had been designated for the use of front organizations may have been funneled to the FPCC. Yet, since even large affiliates owned little more than a mimeograph machine, it is unlikely that Soviet largesse was an important element. Guidance was another matter. The close proximity of national headquarters to the Cuban UN mission made it easy for the Cubans to offer advice which helped to shape FPCC strategy and tactics.

As we have seen, successive events – the failed invasion, the missile crisis, the assassination of a president and Os-

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wald's presumed FPCC membership — had the cumulative effect of destroying the organization. By mid-1964 the FPCC existed in name only.

And what of Taber? Once he became notorious, he was fired by CBS, which was only in the business of exploiting other people's notoriety, and soon disappeared from public view. The question of whether he'd been suborned by Castro during those dramatic three weeks in the Sierra Maestra remains. The evidence suggests that Taber recruited himself with what must have been enthusiastic encouragement from Castro. It was not the first time that fortune had smiled on Castro in the person of an American journalist. Three months earlier Herbert Matthews of the *New York Times* had arrived in the mountains to begin drafting the article which was to provide the movement with a tremendous boost.[28] Later Matthews proved to be helpful in other ways.[29] However, in the critical spring of 1957 Castro was hoping for the appearance of another sympathetic American reporter.[30] Although Taber performed important services for Castro in setting up the FPCC and later operating as a propagandist within Cuba, he cannot be called an agent of influence in the classical meaning of the term which would have found him working subtly and from behind the scene to manipulate opinion. However, Castro appears to have no choice but to accept Taber on his own terms which involved an open commitment.

It is fair to say that the reporting and other activities of Taber and Matthews counted for little in the collapse of the Batista regime and its replacement by that of Fidel Castro. The effect of their reporting and adjunct services, however, helped to defer critical judgments about Castro which gave him valuable time to consolidate his power.

The work of the FPCC appears to have had little effect in promoting Castroism in the United States beyond a tiny circle of left wing intellectuals who were characteristically disposed to view the U.S. Government as wrong and immoral and any leftwing regime abroad as right and moral. It is

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unlikely that either Norman Mailer or Kenneth Tynan, both of whom were charter members of the FPCC, persuaded anyone who was not already inclined to view Castro in a favorable light.

The current political action campaign is different in emphasis and scope from that of the FPCC. No attempt is being made to utilize U.S. extremist organizations to mobilize grass roots support for a change in policy. Instead Castro is concentrating his attention on influential people within the foreign policy establishment. Whether the present effort will be any more successful than that of the 1950s is uncertain since putative supporters of rapprochement seem to comprise a distinct minority within the Congress and the media, and few scholars appear to object to our current policy of viewing Castro as the principal fomenter of subversion in the hemisphere.

Footnotes

1. Internal CIA memorandum of 26 November 1953; subject: A.J. Hidell. Information drawn from FBI report dated 25 October 1963.
2. The torrent of books and articles which flowed from the assassination and investigation are not in agreement as to Oswald's membership in the FPCC or whether the New Orleans chapter had been authorized by the national organization. These questions are moot since records of the organization, which were never complete or current, disappeared sometime in 1963, possibly because of increasing Congressional scrutiny of the organization. What is significant is that the FPCC did not deny Oswald's affiliation, only his ties to the national leadership.
3. CIA message of 18 December 1963 to the White House, State Department and FBI. Gibson walked into the U.S. embassy in Paris and talked to an officer who observed that the former FPCC official may have recognized Oswald from news photographs which were widely circulated after the assassination.
4. CIA outgoing message of 2 December to field stations citing editorial piece.
5. Bonsal, "Cuba, Castro and the U.S." in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1967, p. 266.
6. Officially known as the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary.
7. Beals testimony, SSS hearings, 29 April 1960, pp. 1-11.
8. Taber testimony, *ibid*, 5 May 1960, p. 46.
9. Herbert L. Matthews, *Revolution in Cuba*, pp. 91-92. The author, a *New York Times* editor, responded to an invitation from Castro to the newspaper and met the Cuban revolutionary leader on 17 February 1957 after being smuggled from Havana to the Sierra Maestra by supporters of the movement. The result was an article published on 24, 25 and 26 February which captured the imagination of the paper's influential

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readership and transformed Castro into a legendary figure. In addition the article greatly exaggerated the number of rebels under arms in the mountains and gave considerable comfort to Castro's supporters.
10. Tabor testimony, SSS hearings, pp. 47-49.
11. *ibid*, p. 42.
12. *ibid*, p. 45.
13. Santos-Buch testimony, SSS hearings, 10 January 1961, pp. 78-92. The "friends" wasn't much of a cover story since the conspirators had not even agreed on the identity of the eight.
14. Gibson testimony, SSS hearings, 25 April 1961, p. 146.
15. *ibid*, testimony of 25 April 1961, p. 199.
16. Taber testimony, 14 April 1963, part I, pp. 152-161.
17. *ibid*, pp. 168-169.
18. *ibid*, p. 191-2. Roa, of course, was the former official assigned to the UN who cashed the check which permitted Taber and Santos-Buck to pay for the *New York Times* placement. It is noteworthy that Taber's Cuban passport was issued by Roa's father in his capacity as foreign minister.
19. *ibid*, p. 180. Aside from his one conviction there was some question as to whether Taber might have been confused with someone of the same name in the commission of other crimes.
20. *ibid*, Gibson testimony of 25 April 1962, pp. 181-182.
21. Conference of 1-3 July 1961, reported in the *New York Times* of 4 July, p. 7. It is interesting to note that a year earlier Taber had described the FPCC as comprising 2,000 members. *New York Times*, 12 October 1961, p. 2.
22. *New York Times*, 12 October 1961, p. 2.
23. Committee for Un-American Activities (HUAC), House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd session. Testimony of Lewis and Roberts, 26-27 April 1962, p. 1569.
24. *ibid*, pp. 1522-1526. Although neither witness was willing to answer questions about his political affiliations, the HUAC staff provided substantial documentary evidence for the record.
25. "V.T. Lee" may well have been Vincent Lee, national executive secretary. If so Tampa Bay may have been something of a phantom chapter run out of New York.
26. SSS hearings of 14 February 1963, annex, pp. 53-69.
27. SSS hearings of 16 May 1961, exhibit 47, p. 277.
28. See footnote 9 above.
29. Mario Llerena, *The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism*, Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 93-34. The author, a leader of the movement in 1957 who subsequently defected, describes how Matthews arranged with CBS to interview him, Llerena, as a "secret agent" of the Castro underground in the U.S., thus affording the movement favorable publicity.
30. *ibid*, pp. 103-104. Llerna quotes Armando Hart, one of Castro's closest confidants, as indicating "...that after February 1957 Castro preferred to have some other reporters. Matthews and the *Times* could be considered 'in our pockets' and it was better to keep them in reserve for the future.... Good publicity required the impression of absolute impartiality in the reporting...."

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EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT IN JAPAN LESSONS FOR THE WEST

Richard Lynn
M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York

The author, who is professor of psychology at the University of Ulster and a long-standing editorial committee member of *The Mankind Quarterly*, has completed a detailed survey of the contemporary Japanese educational system which is supported by ample statistical data. The result is probably the first comprehensive survey of Japanese education to appear in the English language.

Analyzing the means by which the well-known high standards of educational performance are achieved in Japan, the author identifies four principal factors. First he notes that the Japanese Government has laid down a well-planned core curriculum that teachers are required to adhere to. Secondly he observes that the school year is significantly longer than in present-day Western schools – an element which is perceived and judged very differently by various Western educators, many of whom wish to protect the student's right to a free childhood believing that this enhances the quality of life and encourages creativity and originality. Thirdly, that Japanese teenagers are provided with strong incentives for academic achievement by their society and cultural tradition. In particular, competitive entrance examinations for admission to senior high schools and universities, the significance of school and university achievement for recruitment in the job market, and parental emphasis upon examinations and stronger parental influence over their children ensure the dedication of Japanese students to their studies. Fourthly, the Japanese school system provides strong incentives for the teachers themselves to work

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efficiently.

Professor Lynn believes that the West could emulate the Japanese example, to a certain degree, with beneficial results. He includes a discussion of the British educational system and of commissions set up to improve academic performance in British schools, as well as a brief reference to American experience in this area. Possibly the most difficult problem facing the West is the lack of consensus among educators as to the goals of the educational system, a problem which is reinforced by acute disagreements concerning cultural ideology as well as structural resistance to any reorganization of the present school system.

THE IMPROBABLE SURVIVOR
Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988
Stevan K. Pavlowitch
Ohio State University Press

The author has produced a very timely publication, providing historical background reading to the stresses in Yugoslavia which are now making world news.

It is perhaps a weakness that the author is himself committed to the ideal of a "United Yugoslavia" and for this reason he tends to treat Tito more gently than many moralists who were not committed to Yugoslavian unity would choose to do. Nevertheless, while he does not delve as deeply into Tito's darker activities while pretending to fight for "Yugoslav freedom" as a partisan during World War II, the author does speak clearly about Tito's motivations and overall position.

In the chapter entitled "The *'Gastarbeiter'* who became a Pharaoh," Pavlowitch expresses the opinion that Tito was personally motivated primarily by ambition. After fighting as an NCO in the Austro-Hungarian army against the pro-Slavic Czarist forces, he considered emigrating to the United States after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian

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empire, but instead he joined the Communist party and by 1920 had become head of the Zagreb Communist Party organization.

Following training in Moscow, in 1937 he became first secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and was "exactly what Stalin looked for. The perfect conspirator and organizer, he would show uncompromising determination in selecting an unwavering team of lieutenants..." In short, Tito was ruthless, and far from being a "nationalist" as he has sometimes been described, he ruthlessly suppressed any nationalism that could not be harnessed to his own advantage.

With the German invasion of Yugoslavia, "Tito issued his call to arms. In doing so, he was obviously responding to an appeal by the Comintern to assist Russia in resisting the German invasion; but he was also seizing the opportunity provided by the war to launch the revolution....in the spring of 1972 Tito acknowledged that 'it was well and truly a civil war, but we did not want to admit this at the time, because it would have been detrimental to our cause'."

Fighting more against the chetniks and forces loyal to the legitimate government of Yugoslavia, the myth that Tito fought a patriotic war against the German invaders has now been replaced, the author asserts, by "a messy tale of internecine strife" – much the same story as in Denmark and other European countries where the Marxist-dominated resistance forces spent more time assassinating their traditional political opponents than harassing the German occupying forces.

"Yugoslavs were slaughtered by other Yugoslavs more than by foreign soldiers. Once the 'others' had been assigned the role of vermin, it as no longer wrong to eliminate them, all the more so because it was necessary to remove those who stood in the way of one's designs."

Without informing the Soviets, Tito actually approached the Germans for a truce while he attacked the chetniks, promising that he would be prepared to fight the British if

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British troops invaded Yugoslavia to support the chetniks or other non-communist loyalist guerrillas. Thus he eliminated most of his potential rivals long before the end of the war. He never deviated from war against the non-communist elements in Yugoslavia, but once the Cold War developed, his show of independence from the Soviet Union, and his tight dictatorial control over Yugoslavia, made it easy for him to win vast financial aid from the West, thus securing his position yet further.

THE MAKING OF A GOVERNMENT

Roderic A. Camp
University of Arizona Press

Since the rise to power of the ruling Revolutionary Party in Mexico decades ago, all who know the country are aware the allegations of extensive and improper patronage and election fraud by which the party has retained power. Recent elections have suggested that for the first time in decades the power of the revolutionary ruling party is being challenged by broad-based support for the opposition party. However, Roderic Camp studies the Mexican political system, and concludes that the continued control of the present revolutionary party leaders over the Mexican political situation is still assured through the elaborate system that has been developed for recruiting successive generations of leaders.

DISMANTLING THE STATE

The Theory and Practice of Privatization

Madsen Pirie
National Center for Policy Analysis, Washington D.C.

The author, a British national, discusses the Thatcher government experiment in transferring government owned

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enterprises, most of which had been nationalized by previous Labor party governments, to private ownership.

The projects included in this privatization program include British Telecom (the huge government-owned telephone and telegraph complex), British Leyland (the manufacturers of Jaguar), a controlling interest in the North Sea oil stock, formerly held by the government, much of the government stock in British Petroleum, various subsidiary aspects of British Steel, British Airways, and possibly, at some future date, also British Rail.

Many of these enterprises had been privately-owned until nationalized by earlier Labor governments. Indeed, when the present Conservative government came to power, 10% of Britain's gross national product was attributed to industrial sectors that had been nationalized during the previous decades. As a result of government sale of these assets, and of enterprises such as British Telecom (which had always been government managed), no less than 400,000 workers who had been employed *in* government controlled jobs — nearly one third of the total workforce — have been transferred to the private sector.

The theory behind privatization is that privately run enterprises will be more efficient than government managed concerns, and that the need for the state to subsidize poorly performing government managed operations will cease to be a drain on the taxpayer.

BACK TO THE GHETTO
Zionism in Retreat
Uri Huppert
Prometheus Books

Through the ages, many members of less fortunate nations have regarded the Jewish people with envy because of their relative prosperity, but while as a whole the Jewish people have been markedly loyal to their own nation when

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faced with envy or open antagonism, as a community they still experience internal dissension as do other peoples. Such internal dissension is the subject matter of this book.

From the time of the Neo-Messianic doctrines of the Nineteenth Century to the present day, the loyalty of Jewish people has been to a large extent torn between atheistic or agnostic loyalty to the tradition of Marx, Engels and socialism on the one extreme to the strictures of orthodox Judaism on the other. Although Zionism has had a broad appeal to Jews of most convictions, its *raison d'etre* was primarily the religious imperative of rebuilding Jerusalem. On the other hand, many of the earliest Jewish settlers in what was to become Israel were socialist devotees of the kibbutz, and the driving force that established Israel was largely that of the East European socialist Jews.

Nevertheless, to the religious Jew Israel must have religious overtones, and the power of the orthodox members of that community has been steadily growing, while the second generation of kibbutz-dwellers have tended to lose much of their parents' devotion to socialism. This has lead to the resurgence of more orthodox concepts, such as the demand that only Jews born of Jewish mothers should have automatic rights to citizenship in Israel, and socialist idealists in modern Israel are beginning to fear that the renaissance of strict orthodox Judaic doctrines will convert Israel into a rabbinically directed ghetto.

Fearful of this possibility, Uri Huppert and many of his colleagues are now advocating that the socialist Jews in Israel who oppose the growing power of their more orthodox compatriots should form stronger bonds with the large, wealthy and influential non-orthodox Jewish communities overseas, so as to gain the aid of these non-orthodox diaspora Jews who have not chosen to return to Israel to help maintain the secular tradition inside Israel. While only a specialist can evaluate Huppert's arguments, the book makes stimulating reading for anyone interested in contemporary world affairs.

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EDUCATION AND ETHNICITY:
The U.S. Experiment in School Education

By Dr. Ralph Scott
Director, Educational Clinic, University of Northern Iowa

PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE: A NEW DILEMMA FOR AMERICAN BLACKS



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"Push-Through" Educational Programs.

It is perplexing that circumstances have worsened for literally millions of minority youths during a period which has witnessed the burgeoning of special programs designed to help them. For more than three decades the entire structure of U.S. education has been dramatically reshaped. However, as U.S. schools become racially 'balanced,' educators were forced to deal with large ethnic achievement gaps at the high school level. It is not uncommon, for example, for a tenth grade student to have trouble reading a third grade textbook while sitting beside classmates capable of college work. Typically, ability grouping was abolished, and classrooms and instructional groupings were racially balanced. Other race-conscious intervention measures followed: informal quotas on student discipline, on grading practices and in composition of 'special' classrooms. Ethnic quotas on discipline and suspensions have forced teachers to tolerate behavior which is most efficaciously curbed during the formative years. Racial quotas for exceptional students have radically altered what is meant by the terms 'mentally retarded,' 'gifted' and 'learning disabled.' Uncritical promotions have led to unacceptably high failure rates in high school and universities. The sensitive racial topics consideed throughout this book are intended to promote rethinking of basic educational strategies which have proven to be harmful for both black and white students alike.

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THE NEW HEGEMONY: DENG XIAOPING'S CHINA FACES THE WORLD

By Julian Weiss

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Monograph Series No. 18. ISBN 0-930690-21-4
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Author Julian Weiss examines the negotiating techniques of the PRC government during recent years, and finds that despite Beijing's new "opening to the world" in economic affairs, and less activist pose in relation to Third World countries generally, the official government position still exhibits signs of a policy aimed at ensuring ultimate Chinese "hegemony" at least on the Asian scene.

The PRC attitude toward Hong Kong and Macao, as exhibited in negotiations with the British and Portuguese government, revealed no effort to meet the concerns of the decolonizing powers to any discernible degree, every care being taken to ensure that Beijing would have ultimately full control over the populations of these two territories once they had been absorbed into the People's Republic of China. Similarly, despite propaganda concerning self-determination in Tibet, the historical record shows that no consideration has been extended to Tibetan public opinion or wishes, and that Beijing has remained determined to follow its own goals in Tibet, notwithstanding lip-service to local autonomy.

The implications for current PRC-Taiwan negotiations are also examined.

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